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Abstract 
 
 
Cognitive theories of social anxiety propose that negative mental imagery plays a central role in the 
maintenance of the disorder. Research has indicated that the content of such mental imagery represents 
negative core beliefs and derives from specific formative, negative autobiographical events. 
This dissertation examines the efficacy and mechanisms of imagery rescripting (IR), a novel 
intervention for social anxiety that works with the content of the negative autobiographical event to 
transform embedded meaning and corresponding affect. A total of 27 participants with a clinical 
diagnosis of SAD completed diagnostic assessment and a semi-structured interview designed to identify 
recurrent images, corresponding autobiographical memories, and the personal meaning these represent 
to the individual. Then, participants were randomly assigned either to waitlist or a single session of IR. 
Results from between- and within-group analyses indicated superiority of IR to waitlist as evidenced by 
significant changes in conjunction with IR from pre- to post-intervention in symptoms of emotional 
distress and core negative cognitions as well as other hypothesized outcome variables. These gains were 
generally maintained at 1-week and 1-month follow-up, with substantial effect sizes. Results indicated, 
in particular, that IR leads to robust changes in self-related cognitions, which, in turn, lead to decreases 
in SAD symptoms. Implications and future directions are discussed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Images in Social Anxiety 
According to cognitive models of social anxiety (SA), a key factor in the persistence of 
the disorder is the intrusion of recurrent, negative imagery into awareness when high SA 
individuals anticipate or enter anxiety-provoking situations (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Hofmann, 2007; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). These images, which may contain multi-sensory and 
cognitive elements, consist of feared, self-relevant mental representations and are believed to 
highlight particularly the aspects of the self which the individual believes to be faulty or flawed 
(e.g. Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The images, most typically, 
are a distorted picture of the self from a negatively biased observer perspective, or of a context 
imbued with a subjective sense of threat (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004; Hackmann, Surawy, & 
Clark, 1998). 
Cognitive models posit a cycle that maintains social anxiety wherein negative imagery is 
activated when individuals are under social threat (Clark & Wells, 1995), and then relied upon 
for information about one’s current presentation or performance. Reliance on the image as a 
source of accurate information is problematic because images have been shown to contain 
distorted representations of the self and evoke a strong emotional response (Holmes & Mathews, 
2005). Due to the erroneous perception that the image is accurate and current (e.g., Hackmann et 
al., 1998; Hirsch, Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003), individuals adjust their behaviour – for 
example by dressing so as to conceal sweating, or planning what they will say in even a casual 
interaction – according to what they perceive within the image (“ex-consequentia reasoning”; 
Arntz, Rauner, & van den Hout, 1995; also, Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004). Such 
compensatory behaviours may prevent disconfirmation of biased assumptions by pre-empting the 
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possibility of feared outcomes (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; Salkovskis, 1991); hence, beliefs and 
assumptions are not updated, and the individual continues to perceive threat where it may not 
exist, and to behave according to that imaginary threat. According to recent research, most 
(Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitch, 2011) or virtually all (Hackmann, Clark, 
& McManus, 2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998) individuals with SAD or high levels of 
trait SA experience recurrent, intrusive imagery.  
Negative, recurrent images are proposed to contain a hybrid of stable and flexible content 
from long-term memory, internal cues, and external cues (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997); that is, 
they are comprised of an enduring image which may be altered according to the situation to 
include or emphasize contextually relevant content. Following from the maintenance model of 
SAD described above (i.e., Clark & Wells, 1995), the image’s enduring content is historically-
derived, carrying over feared content from the past as new information fails perpetually to be 
integrated into the image. Indeed, numerous studies have found that imagery content and valence 
correspond to specific events in autobiographical memory. Using a semi-structured interview 
with a clinical sample of patients diagnosed with social anxiety disorder (SAD), Hackmann and 
colleagues (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Wild, 
Hackmann, & Clark, 2007; Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2008) found that 100% of participants 
reported experiencing negative, recurrent, intrusive images in anxiety-provoking social 
situations. Using more rigorous methodology with an analogue sample of high and low SA 
undergraduates, Moscovitch and colleagues (Moscovitch et al., 2011) found that 76% percent of 
high SA participants reported such images. Furthermore, most (74%, in Moscovitch, et al., 2011) 
or nearly all (96% in Hackmann et al., 2000) participants who reported experiencing recurrent, 
intrusive images were able to identify a distressing earlier experience from which they believed 
 3 
 
the contents of the recurrent image were derived.
1 
The negative autobiographical event that 
participants described as corresponding to their images tended to occur around the recalled onset 
or marked increase of SA symptoms (Hackmann, et al., 2000), implying that the event played a 
pivotal role in anxiety development.. Some have likened the phenomenon of intrusive imagery in 
social anxiety to that of intrusive imagery in posttraumatic stress disorder (Erwin, Heimberg, 
Marx, & Franklin, 2006; Wild & Clark, 2011). Additionally, across methodologies and research 
labs, it has been found that when evoked in the present, the images retrieved by socially anxious 
participants tend to correspond to deeply held meanings about the self, others, or the world 
(Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; Moscovitch et al., 2011; Wild et al., 2007 & 2008).  
These findings may be taken together to indicate that imagery could gainfully be used as 
an entry-point into underlying cognitions and affect.  Based on how one conceptualizes the role 
of imagery in social anxiety, numerous approaches might be available to decrease symptoms by 
working with imagery.  Presently, CBT approaches to working with imagery that are common in 
the literature tend to correspond with a present-focused cognitive model which delineates the 
cyclical connections between imagery, thoughts, feelings, behaviours, and self-focused attention 
(see Figure 1). Techniques that work with imagery from this orientation emphasize interrupting 
the anxiety cycle using present-focused techniques aimed at correcting a distorted self-image 
through observation and hypothesis testing.  The prime example of such a technique, which 
targets imagery specifically, is video feedback, which has been rigorously examined and refined 
(e.g., Orr & Moscovitch, 2011) and has been incorporated into CBT packages to improve the 
efficacy of commonly administered treatments (e.g., Clark, Ehlers, Hackmann, McManus, 
Fennell, Grey, et al., 2003). Cognitive restructuring (e.g., Hope, Burns, Hayes, Herbert, & 
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Warner, 2010), a staple cognitive component of CBT, may be used to challenge thoughts, such 
as assumptions, beliefs, and predictions, that correspond to imagery content.  
In contrast to Clark and Wells’ model (and related variants, such as Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997, and Hofmann, 2007), cognitive theory provides us with an alternative (though 
complementary) transdiagnostic theoretical model to complement the present-focused model just 
described (see Figure 2).  This model (e.g., Butler, Fennell, & Hackmann, 2009; Greenberger & 
Padesky, 1995; Safran, Vallis, Segal, & Shaw, 1986) attributes the impact of intrusive imagery to 
the negative meaning represented in the images, via negative automatic thoughts, underlying 
assumptions, and core beliefs. Further, it proposes that images and their associated meanings 
may be traced to early experiences; that is, that the source of the image’s content is the subjective 
memory of a particular (in this case, negative) event.  
To illustrate this model, the following is an example of “Jason,” one of the participants 
from the pilot phase of the present study.
2
 Jason reported experiencing a recurrent image of 
himself in which everything else disappears and he is alone in a harsh, white room with 
extremely bright lighting; he hears the sound of his own voice: weak, shaky, and distorted, as it 
echoes in this empty space. The image is imbued with a sense of intense fear, isolation, and 
scrutiny from some unknown source. This image occurs whenever Jason feels nervous in a social 
situation – for example, when called on in class and when in novel social interactions. Jason 
reported that, almost always, the image is followed by the spontaneous intrusion of a thought: “I 
wish I had my coffee. If only I had my coffee, I could speak better.” Looking for the subjective 
meaning of this thought, and how it related to the image, he reported believing that one must be 
able to speak clearly and confidently in order to appear intelligent and credible; and that if one 
could not speak in this way, one would be victimized and accused of being “bad” or stupid. 
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Going beyond this conditional assumption (using the therapeutic technique of a “downward 
arrow”; see Methods), he reported core beliefs that, “I am dumb; other people are better than me 
and I can’t relate to others; and that people just don’t care.” Asked if he could recall an 
occurrence in his own life that would have led to the formation of the image, Jason explained 
that although the visual content seemed somewhat different, he knew the exact event to which 
the image and the accompanying thoughts and feelings corresponded. He went on to describe his 
recollection of an “extremely traumatic” event from his childhood in which he was wrongly 
accused of pushing a girl in the schoolyard and was then punished and humiliated at the front of 
a school assembly. He described feeling paralyzed by the situation and having no ability to speak 
up for himself; he felt victimized by the adults in the scene and ostracized by his peers. He 
believed that the situation would have been different had he been able to express himself – to say 
the right things to change the situation – but that, as it transpired, he had been unfairly made an 
example of by his teachers and, as a result, believed that he appeared stupid  and “bad” to his 
fellow students. 
What are the implications for treatment of the cognitive model depicted in Figure 2, in 
which negative imagery may be traced back to specific autobiographical memory and is 
threatening because of the idiosyncratic meaning it represents? One approach would be to access 
meaning through imagery and to work within the structure of the memory to create cognitive and 
affective change. Indeed, available evidence indicates that modification of intrusive imagery, 
generally, has been helpful in treating a number of disorders, including social anxiety disorder 
(SAD; for an overview, see Stopa, 2009). This approach is further supported by other theoretical 
models, including emotional-processing theory (Foa & Kozak, 1986), which asserts that memory 
networks must be activated in order to alter fear associations; the Interacting Cognitive 
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Subsystems approach (Teasdale, 1993), which emphasizes the schematic nature of the 
interrelationships among meaning, experiences, and emotions; and the Retrieval Competition 
account of cognitive behavioural therapy (Brewin, 2006), which underscores the importance of 
strengthening associations to positive representations in memory as a means of decreasing the 
influence of negative representations and related symptom-maintaining cognitions and 
behaviours. Indeed, targeting the imagery-memory structure is precisely what Wild and 
colleagues (2007; 2008) did in their pioneering trials of imagery rescripting (IR) for social 
anxiety, which are described in more detail below.  
In IR (see Arntz & Weertman, 1999, for a complete description of the procedure), a 
therapeutically relevant autobiographical memory initially is identified. This typically consists of  
a negative memory that continues to influence the individual, such as one in which he or she 
experienced rejection, humiliation, exclusion, or was otherwise impacted in a negative manner. 
IR occurs in 3 phases in which the subject’s idiosyncratic accounts of imagery and corresponding 
negative autobiographical memories are the target of  ‘rescripting’ efforts that are geared toward 
altering their valence and associated meaning. In phase 1, subjects recount the memory from 
their own point of view  at the time of the event (the “prior self”). Subjects are directed (and, if 
necessary, reminded) to describe the scene using the first person (e.g., “I am standing at the front 
of the class”), conveying as much detail as they can recall, including characteristics of the 
environment, others present, and their own feelings and thoughts, as well as the sequence of 
events. Once this is complete, phase 2 begins, in which subjects observe the scene from the 
perspective of the current self (the “current self”). In other words, they observe it from the 
perspective of an adult, as they would presumably observe it if they should happen upon the 
scene today. Subjects are instructed to begin to participate in the scene as their current self, doing 
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whatever needs to be done to make the outcome of the event more positive or satisfying for the 
prior self. These interventions may be interactive between prior and current self (e.g., “I look 
myself in the eyes and say, ‘Don’t worry if you screwed up. You’re a great kid. This event 
means nothing in the big picture and you’re going to go on to do so much with your life!’”), or 
between prior or current self and others in the scene (e.g., confronting a bully or a critical 
parent). The subject is encouraged to continue to intervene in the scene until the negative valence 
of the event has transformed and/or dissipated. In phase 3, the subject once again assumes the 
perspective of the prior self during the event and recounts the whole event again in the first 
person, this time incorporating the new content from phase 2. Finally, the researcher/therapist 
asks if there is anything else that the prior self would like from the current self, or if there is 
anything the subject wishes to see changed in the event; if so, the subject is permitted to enact 
this within the scene until the subject deems that it has been completed. Once phase 3 has been 
completed, the researcher/therapist typically acknowledges and validates the efforts of the 
subject (as appropriate/relevant) and collaboratively processes the experience with the subject 
with the intention of summarizing changes and making them explicit, thereby, helping the 
subject consolidate gains. 
The two primary studies in this area (Wild et al., 2007 & 2008) reported promising 
findings on the efficacy of IR for SA. Both studies used modest samples (ns = 11 and 14, 
respectively) of treatment-seeking individuals with a clinical diagnosis of SAD.  Both studies 
began with a semi-structured interview to assess participants’ recurrent negative images and 
corresponding autobiographical memories, and to identify core beliefs/meanings encapsulated in 
these images and memories. In the 2007 trial, a single session of IR was administered one week 
after the assessment, immediately following an initial phase of cognitive restructuring, in which 
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negative beliefs represented by the images/memories were challenged by evaluating and 
weighing evidence for and against the beliefs. The 2008 study was designed in a similar fashion 
but also included a within-subjects control session, in which all participants initially took part in 
an open-ended exploration and discussion of their image and corresponding memory and then 
received IR in a second session one week later. Target outcome measures were assessed and 
compared before vs. after the active intervention. In both studies, self-report measures of distress 
and vividness of participants’ images and memories, strength of their encapsulated beliefs, and 
social anxiety symptoms were administered at pre-intervention, post-intervention, and at 1 week 
follow up. Paired samples t-tests of pre- and post-intervention and repeated-measures ANOVAs 
incorporating scores at followup revealed significantly reduced strength of belief in negative core 
cognitions embedded in negative images and associated memories (Cohen’s ds of 1.49 and 1.66 
at 1-week followup vs. pretreatment in the 2007 and 2008 studies, respectively) and decreased 
self-reported distress associated with the negative memory targeted in the IR session (Cohen’s ds 
of 4.86 and 1.57 at 1-week followup in the 2007 and 2008 studies, respectively). Further, 
participants reported significant decreases in social anxiety on the Liebowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale (LSAS-SR; Cox, Ross, Swinson, & Direnfeld, 1998; see Methods for details), an 
empirically validated self-report measure of social anxiety (Cohen’s ds of 0.76 and 1.18 at 1-
week followup in 2007 and 2008 studies, respectively). In the 2008 study, symptom changes 
were significant after the intervention, while the control session had no effect. In a recent study, 
Lee & Kwon (2013) examined IR combined with cognitive restructuring as a brief “stand-alone” 
treatment for SAD. Comparing to a control condition (in this case, “attention and support”), this 
study also found significant improvements in social anxiety which were larger than those evident 
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in the control condition (which, in this study, also led to significant improvement relative to 
baseline). 
These initial studies and their intriguing findings raised many important questions about 
both the nature of the mechanisms that may be responsible for the efficacy of IR for SAD and the 
methodology used in the administration and evaluation of this new intervention. For example, 
the methodology used in these two studies prevented clear conclusions from being drawn about 
the unique impact of IR because of the inclusion of cognitive restructuring (CR) in the treatment 
protocol. Indeed, at the time of the present study’s design, Wild and colleagues’ trials were the 
only ones available in the literature. During the time that the present study was being run, a new 
study was published that examined the efficacy of IR without the inclusion of CR (Nilsson, 
Lundh, & Viborg, 2012). Nilsson and colleagues found that IR was efficacious even in the 
absence of CR, both from pre- to post-intervention and in comparison to an inert control 
condition to which half of the participants were randomly assigned, with effect sizes for 
between-groups comparisons that were comparable to the within-group comparisons reported by 
Wild and colleagues for symptom measures [Cohen’s ds = 1.18 and 0.63, on the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969) and the Social Interaction Anxiety 
Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clark, 1998), respectively; changes to degree of negativity of meaning 
of the image (Cohen’s d = 2.59); and reductions in imagery and memory distress (Cohen’s ds = 
0.51 and 1.38, respectively)].  
Building upon these previous studies, the present study aimed to clarify previous findings 
about the efficacy of IR without CR and also to extend the empirical examination of IR for SAD 
by measuring its impact on specific therapeutic change processes and outcomes. It was expected 
that measuring the impact of IR on a variety of hypothesized change processes in the present 
 10 
 
study could help to inform future hypothesis-driven studies that would be designed specifically 
to investigate the mechanisms (i.e., mediators and moderators) underlying the efficacy of this 
specific intervention.  Furthermore, a waitlist (WL) control condition and random assignment of 
participants to either IR or WL were included so as to isolate the impact of the intervention over 
and above any changes that may occur simply due to the passage of time, the repeated 
measurement of outcome variables within a single active condition, and/or any non-specific 
effects that may be related to inclusion in a therapy trial. 
 
1.2 Overview of the Present Study 
In this dissertation, I examined the efficacy of IR (without CR) administered as a single-
session intervention in comparison to a WL control condition and a set of theoretically derived 
change processes. Outcome and process measures were assessed at pre-treatment, post-
intervention and at 1- week and 1-month followup time points. Despite the compelling previous 
research on IR for SAD (Nilsson et al., 2012; Wild et al., 2007 & 2008), important questions 
remained both about the specific effects of this intervention and the nature of the processes that 
may drive symptom reduction. Thus, replication of previous findings on the effects of IR on 
symptom reduction in SAD was of interest, but a further goal was to improve understanding of 
the possible “active ingredients” of IR by measuring changes in therapeutically-relevant 
processes and outcomes and examining the correspondence between changes in such processes 
and changes in social anxiety symptoms.  
Our first objective was to examine the efficacy of IR with respect to improving symptoms 
of social anxiety and depression, changing the strength and valence of negative core beliefs, 
modifying the influence of the image on participants’ perceptions of self, others, and the world, 
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and changing perceptual qualities of recurrent imagery and negative memories in SAD. 
Perceptual qualities include how real the image seemed, the ability to mentally change or 
manipulate features of the image, how much shame and embarrassment about aspects of the self 
are represented in the image. An important starting place, it seemed, for refining the methods of 
earlier studies (Wild et al., 2007 & 2008; and more fully detailed in Wild & Clark, 2011) was to 
revisit the context for the delivery of IR. This was considered important because the method of 
the first two studies on this topic (Wild et al., 2007 & 2008) did not ascertain the unique impact 
of IR because, as it was delivered, IR was preceded by formal CR. In other words, IR was 
combined with a technique already well-known to be effective (e.g., Mattick & Peters, 1988; 
Taylor, 1996). Hence, as a first step in making a meaningful contribution to the field’s 
understanding of IR, in the present study IR was conducted in isolation from other treatment 
techniques.
4
 As well, the study design allowed for the investigation of whether “insight alone” 
into one’s underlying memories is sufficient to create the context for symptom change. Indeed, 
prior research (e.g., Hackmann et al. 2000) has noted that subjects undergoing clinical interviews 
to identify imagery and related memories often suddenly become aware of the connection 
between their image and their earlier memory. Our study was designed in a manner that allows 
us to determine whether this insight alone might be driving the effects of IR. Since imagery and 
memories are assessed in an initial session before participants are randomly assigned to either 
waitlist or active treatment, it would be reasonable to presume that if insight alone has significant 
therapeutic effects, symptom changes would occur even during this initial session, even among 
participants who are ultimately assigned to the waitlist control group. As such, symptoms were 
measured both before and after this initial session. 
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In Wild and colleagues’ initial trial on IR (2007), no control condition was used; thus, 
results consisted of within-subjects comparisons. The two subsequent trials of IR (Wild et al., 
2008 and Nilsson et al., 2012) improved upon the methodology of the first study by employing 
control conditions. In the first of these, the within-subjects control condition consisted of a single 
session of open-ended memory and image discussion and exploration, without therapeutic 
direction. Results showed that the therapeutic effects were isolated to the subsequent session in 
which the active intervention was administered, as no changes to target variables were evident 
immediately following the control session or one week later. This was certainly informative, 
over and above a no-control design, but the other major methodological problem – namely, that 
CR was combined with IR - still remained unaddressed. In Nilsson and colleagues’ study 
(Nilsson et al., 2012), further refinements were introduced. First and foremost, IR was delivered 
without CR. Second, this group also included a between-subjects control condition in their 
design to which half of the participants were randomly assigned (in this case, a reading task in 
which participants perused information about CBT). In analyzing efficacy, the primary 
comparisons were, therefore, computed between- rather than within-subjects, which helped to 
control for the possibility of any cumulative or delayed impact of a within-subjects control 
session, like the one used in Wild and colleagues’ design. The results of this 2012 study 
indicated that IR was efficacious in the absence of CR relative to the control condition, with 
comparable effect sizes as those reported in the earlier studies, as detailed above. 
As in the Nilsson et al. (2012) study, an inert control condition was used (waitlist; WL; 
see Methods, below, for details), with comparisons between the control and active conditions 
measured at pre-treatment, post-treatment, and 1-week followup. Previous studies of IR for SAD 
found strong effects of the treatment immediately following intervention, as well as at 1-week 
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followup. Given the endurance of improvements over one week in previous studies, studying the 
maintenance of gains over a longer period of time was of interest. Assessment after one week has 
the greatest implications for IR within the context of a treatment plan with weekly sessions; to 
improve understanding of IR as a stand-alone intervention, in the present study, outcomes of IR 
were also observed after a longer passage of time – in this case, one month. 
 Beyond symptom reduction, a secondary set of questions in the present study pertained to 
whether the intervention would lead to identifiable changes across more highly specified 
therapeutic process variables. This set of questions was of particular interest, given the paucity of 
investigation into the “active ingredients” of IR. Based on theory and clinical observation, there 
were a number of variables that were hypothesized to change as a result of IR and to be 
significantly associated with changes in symptoms during the active intervention. These are 
detailed below. 
 
1.3 Primary Research Questions and Hypotheses: Efficacy of Imagery Rescripting 
1.3.1 Symptom reduction. The primary topic of inquiry in the present study was the 
efficacy of IR as a stand-alone, single-session intervention. I hypothesized that immediately 
following the intervention and at 1-week and 1-month followup, participants who received IR 
would report significant decreases in symptoms of social anxiety (on the SPIN and LSAS-SR; 
see Measures section and Timeline, Appendix A) and depression (on the depression subscale of 
the DASS) relative to pretreatment. To ascertain the strength of such effects while ruling out 
effects of participation in the study (both in general and as a result of assessment sessions within 
the study) and the passage of time, comparisons were made between the changes participants 
reported in the IR condition from pre-treatment to post-treatment and followup and changes the 
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participants who were randomized to the WL condition reported over the same time points. I 
hypothesized that the active treatment condition would produce significantly better results than 
WL. Two followup assessments were conducted in order to ascertain whether gains made at the 
time of treatment would be maintained. The first followup time point (FU1) was set for one week 
following the intervention, because it was expected that IR should typically be administered as 
part of a longer course of cognitive-behavioural therapy. Within this context, it would seem most 
relevant to measure maintenance of gains at the most likely next point of contact in therapy; as 
well, prior studies in this area have also assessed outcomes at1-week followup, as reviewed 
above. The second followup time point (FU2) was scheduled for 1 month following the IR 
session, and was designed to measure stability of change. It was hypothesized that the outcomes 
observed at post-intervention would be maintained at 1-week followup, as in previous studies. 
No previous studies have examined the longer-term effects of IR, and so although it was 
expected that the effects of the intervention would continue to be maintained at FU2 to some 
degree, no specific hypotheses were advanced about whether they would likely become 
diminished somewhat due to rebound effects or become even stronger due to continued 
consolidation of gains following the intervention.  
For analysis of change process variables, detailed below, within-subjects analyses were 
primarily used, for two main reasons: first, change over time within participants who received IR 
was the phenomenon of interest and this fits, conceptually, with a within-participants approach to 
analysis. Second, because participants initially randomized to the WL condition later received IR 
as well, it was possible to merge participants across the two conditions and examine change 
process variables in a series of strongly powered within-subjects analyses.  
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1.3.2 Changes in negative core beliefs about the self, others, and the world. I 
hypothesized that content of the target negative cognitions would be revised to assimilate new 
information derived from the intervention. This variable was operationalized by simply counting 
the proportion of participants who generated new or revised core beliefs following the 
intervention
5
. I also hypothesized that, in addition to possible alterations to the content of 
original core beliefs associated with the memory and image, the strength with which participants 
held the original core beliefs would decrease. In other words, I hypothesized that the original 
negative beliefs would not simply disappear but, rather, as the Retrieval Competition Hypothesis 
would dictate (Brewin, 2006), it was expected that participants would hold those beliefs with 
much less conviction after IR than they had at baseline (or that the original beliefs would be less 
accessible to them). Further, I hypothesized that changes to- and decreased strength in core 
beliefs would occur across all three domains (self, others, and the world) following IR. 
Specifically, while IR would seem likely to target self-representations and associated meanings 
most expressly, clinical experience has shown – particularly in the context of socially traumatic 
memories – that negative core beliefs about others are also highly relevant and therefore likely 
would be modified and/or weakened if the treatment was administered effectively. Further, core 
beliefs about the world in general seem to derive from pivotal experiences and, in effect, 
subsume corresponding beliefs about self and others. Simply put, one’s perception of what the 
world is like seems to be at least partly contingent on one’s experience of the self as subject/actor 
in the context of the world (i.e., beliefs about self) and others’ actions and underlying nature (i.e., 
beliefs about others). Thus, while the typical activities of IR might not directly challenge core 
beliefs about the world, new conclusions might be drawn about the world (or old impressions 
and beliefs might be weakened) if the target memory is considered to be representative of the 
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broader world. Therefore, it was also hypothesized that changes to negative core beliefs about 
the self, others, and the world would change and/or weaken as a result of IR..  
1.3.3 Changes in memory and imagery characteristics. As in prior studies (Nilsson et al., 
2012; Wild et al., 2007 & 2008), characteristics of the recurrent image and corresponding 
memory were examined for change at both followup time points as a result of the intervention. 
Towards replication of earlier findings, levels of distress associated with the image and memory 
were hypothesized to decrease as a result of the intervention. Other salient characteristics were 
also expected to change following IR: how real the image seemed, ability to mentally change or 
manipulate features of the image, feelings of shame and embarrassment about aspects of the self 
represented in the image, and the influence of the image on perceptions of self, others and the 
world. 
1.4 Secondary Research Questions and Hypotheses: Specific Therapeutic Processes in Imagery 
Rescripting  
1.4.1 Differentiation of prior self and current self. In their cognitive model of SA, Clark 
and Wells (1995) argue that, for the individual with SAD, the level of anxiety activation is 
inappropriate relative to the current level of objective threat in the social situation.  During the 
process of IR, the participant experientially elaborates the perspective of the prior self versus that 
of the current self, and in doing so, the two are forced into contrast. By alternating between the 
perspective of the prior self and the current self, a distinction is made between the self that was 
the subject of the original event who endured the event in the past and the current self that is 
recalling and reliving the event in the present. This differentiation (as measured by ratings of 
differentiation statements; see Measures, below) was hypothesized to facilitate an updating of 
memory contents/features that participants perceived as being self-relevant threat. Specifically, 
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IR should create an experience in which the participant disambiguates what was threatening to 
the self in the past within the context of a previous negative social experience from how he or 
she would perceive and respond to that same threat as his/her current self within the context of 
present day social encounters. Hence, I hypothesized that differentiation from prior self would 
increase with IR.  
1.4.2 Perceived shift in empowerment. The original memory may be imbued with strong 
feelings of powerlessness. Clinical observation, as well as available evidence (e.g., Erwin et al., 
2006; Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Moscovitch et al., 2011), indicate that pivotal, 
traumatic social memories are often characterised by victimization, alienation, exclusion, 
rejection, humiliation, or other experiences in which the subject perceived themselves as having 
little power to influence these highly personal outcomes . Part of the nature of IR is that the 
subject is instructed and encouraged to take an active and assertive role in meeting his/her own 
needs. Hence, a new sense of empowerment may become associated with the image and 
memory, in place of the previous feelings of powerlessness (as measured by the perceived 
empowerment ratings; see Measures). Thus, it was hypothesized that subjects’ sense of 
empowerment perceived within the memory would increase as a result of IR. Given that IR is an 
imaginal intervention, the definition of psychological empowerment as “an experiential mental 
state rather than an objective condition” (Barak, Boniel-Nissim, & Suler, 2008) is fitting. 
1.4.3 Changes in compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance towards self and others. The 
subjective tone of the target memory may change for the individual as a result of IR, such that 
they view themselves or others differently. As part of the intervention, subjects’ views of 
themselves may shift from extremely negative to more compassionate. For example, having 
previously viewed the self in one’s memory as being a “weakling,” one may now view him as a 
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child needing and worthy of protection (see Gilbert & Procter, 2006, for an interesting review of 
compassion in mental health and as a particularly important component of overcoming shame 
and self-criticism).  Similarly, as part of this process, subjects may come to view others more 
generously, perhaps understanding for the first time the motivations or vulnerabilities of others 
who were part of the event, leading to increased compassion for others. Indeed, although 
compassion is not a formalized instruction in IR (as per Arntz & Weertman, 1999), it has been 
observed that enhancing self-compassion may be an important element of the third phase of the 
rescripting intervention, in particular (Hackmann, 2005; Wild et al., 2008). Second, forgiveness, 
both towards self and others (Worthington, O’Connor, Berry, Sharp, Murray & Yi, 2005), will be 
examined. Through the process of revisiting and then rescripting the memory, subjects may 
come to be more forgiving of the self for previously perceived flaws or faulty behaviour. 
Likewise, while others may once have been viewed as extremely powerful perpetrators, they 
may now be viewed as regular human beings who are capable of being flawed, and whose role in 
the event may be forgivable. Finally in this vein, changes to acceptance towards self and others 
(e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) will be examined. Theoretically, both compassion and 
forgiveness should lead to acceptance; practically, measuring changes to acceptance towards self 
and others might be useful for the conceptual integration of IR into “third-wave” (e.g., Hayes, 
2004; Levin & Hayes, 2011; Orsillo, Roemer, Lerner, & Tull, 2004) CBT programs. These 
constructs were measured in the present study using the compassion, acceptance, and forgiveness 
ratings (see Measures).  
1.4.4 Gaining objective distance (or defusion) from beliefs. Variously known as cognitive 
defusion (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), comprehensive distancing (Zettle & Hayes, 1986), 
decentering (Teasdale, Moore, Hayhurst, Pope, Williams, & Segal, Z.V., 2002), reperceiving 
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(Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006), or self-distancing (e.g., Ayduk & Kross, 2010; 
Kross, 2009; Kross et al., 2005), I proposed that one consequence of IR would be that 
participants would come to view the core beliefs associated with the image and memory from a 
vantage point of greater psychological distance.The term “cognitive defusion” has been used in 
the literature by Hayes and colleagues (1999) and other authors (e.g., Forman et al., 2011) to 
describe the process of achieving greater cognitive distance from one’s internal psychological 
experiences and, thus, I have adopted this terminology here as well. Cognitive defusion was 
assessed in the present study using author-generated items as well as items from the Drexel 
Defusion Scale (Forman et al., 2011; see Measures). Given the central role in IR of introducing a 
new perspective to the formative memory and corresponding meaning, detachment from those 
beliefs would seem to be implicated in such a process.  
 
1.5 What Explains Symptom Change? Correlating Symptom Change with Changes to Other 
Outcome Variables 
 The present study also aimed to answer preliminary questions about possible 
mechanisms of change. Ideally, such questions would be addressed using mediational models 
and corresponding data analysis. The study design and temporal sequencing of measured 
variables did not meet the requirements for a causal mediational model to be proposed or 
analyzed (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002).  
Instead, a more exploratory approach was taken for analyzing which of our significant process 
variables corresponded with symptom changes as a result of IR by examining correlations 
between changes in process variables from pre- to post-treatment and changes in symptom 
outcomes from intake to 1-week followup. As described above, a number of variables were 
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predicted to change as a result of IR, but which of these variables might account specifically for 
symptom reduction was an open question with important implications for developing an initial 
understanding of the “active ingredients” in IR and for informing future hypothesis-based studies 
on mechanisms of treatment.   
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2.0 Methods and Materials 
2.1 Participants 
The sample for this study consisted of undergraduate student participants with a clinical 
diagnosis of SAD. Participants were recruited for the study via the University of Waterloo 
Research Experiences Group, a centralized recruitment mechanism within the Department of 
Psychology in which potential participants complete a number of online measures at the start of 
every semester, and are then recruited into individual studies if they meet pre-established criteria. 
To be invited for the present study, potential participants were required to meet or surpass the 
cutoff scores (described below) on two widely-used self-report measures of social anxiety, the 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor, Davidson, Churchill, Sherwood, Foa, & Weisler, 2000) 
and the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987). Participants were not aware of 
these inclusion criteria. When invited into the laboratory, potential participants then took part in 
a clinical assessment, in which they completed the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(M.I.N.I. 6.0; Sheehan et al., 1998) with a senior graduate student assessor (SGR) with extensive 
background in psychodiagnostic assessment, and completed the SPIN and LSAS again. 
Exclusion criteria for the study were 1) active suicidality; 2) psychosis; 3) alcohol or substance 
use/abuse that would interfere with participation; 4) principal diagnosis of a psychological 
disorder other than social anxiety disorder. Those who both continued to score above the cutoff 
points on the two measures and met full DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
diagnostic criteria for a current principal or co-principal diagnosis of social anxiety disorder, and 
who did not meet predetermined exclusion criteria, were offered continued participation in the 
study. Using this selection process, 60 participants took part in the psychodiagnostic assessment 
session, based on their initial SPIN and LSAS scores. Of those 60, 28 met criteria for a diagnosis 
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of SAD when assessed using the M.I.N.I., and were therefore offered participation in the 
remainder of the study. One participant opted to discontinue at the conclusion of the assessment 
session (due to scheduling constraints that became apparent while trying to book subsequent 
sessions), while 27 continued. Remuneration for participants’ time consisted of money ($5/half 
hour) or a combination of money and participation credits towards their psychology courses; 
time spent in the study ranged from 6 to 9 hours for those who completed the full study (being in 
the waitlist condition added 2 hours of participation time, during which participants completed 
two 1-hour questionnaire sessions, as outlined in the Timeline in Appendix A). 
 
2.2 Procedure 
All potential participants (n = 60) completed the intake session, which was comprised of 
the informed consent process and completion of a semi-structured diagnostic assessment 
interview (the M.I.N.I., see below), followed by a standard series of questionnaires. All those 
who met inclusion criteria and chose to continue in the study (n = 27) were then randomly 
assigned to either the Waitlist (WL) or non-Waitlist (nonWL) conditions and completed a pre-IR 
90-min session in our laboratory which consisted of meeting with the experimenter (SGR) to 
complete the Waterloo Images and Memories Interview (WIMI, Moscovitch et al., 2011) and the 
Associated Cognition Supplement (ACS) (see below). Participants who did not endorse 
experiencing recurrent negative imagery (n = 1) or who did not identify a specific 
autobiographical memory to which the image might have corresponded (n = 1) discontinued their 
participation following the pre-IR session. NonWL participants (n = 13) returned the following 
week for another 90-min in-house session, which consisted of the IR intervention (described in 
detail below), followed by questionnaires (‘post-IR’). At both one week and one month post-IR, 
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nonWL participants then completed two followup questionnaire sessions (FU1 and FU2), which 
were administered online from a location of their choice. As outlined in the Timeline flowchart 
in Appendix A, participants in the WL condition (n = 12) completed online questionnaires at 
time points (WL1 and WL2) that corresponded in time with the IR and FU1 sessions for 
participants who were assigned to the IR condition. Following WL1 and WL2, all WL 
participants then received the IR intervention and post-IR questionnaires and completed the FU1 
and FU2 assessments one week and one month after the intervention. With this design, 
measurements were taken for both groups in parallel, matching responses of WL control 
participants with those who received the active treatment at both post-IR and FU1. Identical sets 
of measures were administered at WL1, WL2, FU1, and FU2, as outlined in Appendix B.  
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1 Clinician-Researcher Administered Interviews 
2.3.1.1 Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.; Sheehan et al., 1998). 
The MINI is a short, semi-structured diagnostic interview based on DSM-IV-TR criteria. The 
Social Anxiety Disorder module from the Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule - IV (ADIS-IV; 
Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994) was also included in the present study to ensure adequate 
solicitation of relevant information. 
2.3.1.2 Waterloo Images and Memories Interview (WIMI; Moscovitch et al., 2011; 
Appendix J). To inquire about the presence of recurrent, intrusive images, the Waterloo Images 
and Memories Interview (WIMI; Moscovitch et al., 2011) was used in the present study. The 
WIMI was originally developed to aid the empirical investigation of images and memories in a 
valid and reliable manner. It is a standardized, semi-structured interview that assesses the 
presence of negative and/or positive images and associated autobiographical memories in 
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anxiety-provoking and non-anxiety-provoking social situations. In the present study, the WIMI 
was used in its original format, except that inquiries were limited to images and corresponding 
memories that intrude in negative/anxiety-provoking social situations only (i.e., the probes about 
positive images/memories were eliminated).  
2.3.1.3 Associated Cognitions Supplement to the WIMI (see Appendix K). The WIMI 
protocol, as developed, does not explicitly explore the idiosyncratic meaning of the 
image/memory for each participant. The Associated Cognitions Supplement (ACS), which was 
created for use in the present study, elaborates this aspect of the WIMI by explicitly pursuing the 
automatic thoughts and underlying beliefs associated with participants’ endorsed images in a 
standardized, semi-structured way within the interview itself.  For the present study it was 
important to identify the personal meaning represented by, or embedded within, participants’ 
endorsed images and memories more systematically than previous methods permitted. Previous 
research (Hackmann et al., 2000) established that beliefs tend to be embedded within such 
imagery, but such information has not been systematically reported (or possibly, elicited). Thus, 
the purpose of including this module in the present study was to have a consistent means of 
inquiring about the presence and content of cognitions embedded in imagery and to examine the 
extent to which IR vs. WL might impact those cognitions over time. The ACS was appended to 
the WIMI in the pre-IR session; findings from the ACS were recorded on the 
Image/Memory/Cognition Summary Sheet (IMC Summary; Appendix L) and the programming 
of the questionnaires permitted participants’ unique content to be embedded in subsequent 
administrations of imagery, memory, and associated cognition items in the following 
questionnaire sessions. 
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2.3.2 Self-Report Measures 
2.3.2.1 Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor, Davidson, Churchill, Sherwood, Foa, & 
Weisler, 2000; Appendix C). The SPIN is a 17-item self-report scale that reliably screens for 
social anxiety. Participants indicate the extent to which each item has been difficult for them 
during the past week, using a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 0 (“Not At All”) to 4 
(“Extremely”); for example, “I am bothered by blushing in front of people,” and, “I avoid doing 
things or speaking to people for fear of embarrassment.” The SPIN has demonstrated good test-
retest reliability (Spearman’s r = .89; Connor et al., 2000) and excellent internal consistency (α =  
.94; Connor et al., 2000). The SPIN can distinguish individuals with clinical levels of SAD from 
both nonclinical (Connor et al., 2000) and clinical (Antony, Coons, McCabe, Ashbaugh, & 
Swinson, 2006) control participants. Although Connor and colleagues (2000) proposed a cutoff 
score of 19 and higher to select participants who are likely to have SAD, others (e.g., 
Moscovitch, Rodebaugh, & Hesch, 2012; Moser, Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2008) have 
expressed a preference for using a more stringent cut-off score of 30. In the present study, a 
cutoff score of 30 was used for initially identifying potentially eligible participants.  The SPIN 
was administered at various time points during the study (see contents of each time point, 
Appendix B, for summary of administrations). In the present study, the SPIN demonstrated 
acceptable internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .75 to .90 across 7 
administrations (intake, pre-IR, post-IR, WL1, WL2, FU1, and FU2). 
2.3.2.2 Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale – Self Report (LSAS-SR; Cox, Ross, Swinson, & 
Direnfeld, 1998; Appendix D). The LSAS-SR is a 24-item scale on which participants rate their 
fear and avoidance of a variety of social situations over the past week using a 4-point Likert 
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scale. The fear scale ranges from 0 (no fear) to 3 (severe fear). Avoidance levels across items are 
also rated using the same numerical anchors, which correspond to the percent of time the 
participant claims to avoid the situation, with scaling of 0=never; 1=occasionally (10%); 2=often 
(33-67%); 3=usually (67-100%). A widely-used measure of social anxiety, the original clinician-
administered version of the LSAS (Liebowitz, 1987) has demonstrated strong validity, reliability, 
and treatment sensitivity (Heimberg, Horner, Juster, Safren, Brown, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 
1999). The theoretically proposed factor structure in which fear and avoidance are considered 
distinct constructs has not been statistically supported (Heimberg et al., 1999; Oakman, Van 
Ameringen, Mancini, & Farvolden, 2003; Safren, Heimberg, Horner, Juster, Schneier, & 
Liebowitz, 1999). The LSAS-SR also produces a useful total score which may be used to screen 
for clinical levels of SA, with research showing that a cutoff score of 47 is  optimal to achieve 
the right balance of sensitivity and specificity (Mennin, Fresco, Heimberg, Schneier, Davies, & 
Liebowitz, 2002). The self-report version of the scale correlates highly with the clinician-
administered version (e.g., Baker, Heinrichs, Kim, & Hofmann, 2002) and total LSAS-SR scores 
achieve strong test-retest reliability (r=0.83, p<0.01), internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.95), and treatment sensitivity (Baker et al., 2002). In the present study, a cutoff of 47 
was used to preselect participants. LSAS-SR scores were also used as a secondary outcome 
measure at each session (see Appendix B), and the measure demonstrated good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .91 to .96 across 7 administrations).  
2.3.2.3 Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 21-item (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995; Appendix E). The DASS-21 is a 3-factor self-report scale of depression, anxiety, and 
stress. Each subscale in the 21-item version has excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 
of .97, .92, and .94 for Depression, Anxiety, and Stress subscales, respectively) and concurrent 
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validity (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998). For the present study, the DASS was 
administered to ensure that participants across the two conditions did not differ in reported levels 
of depression symptoms. Repeated administration of the DASS was also used to examine 
changes in depression symptoms across time. In the present study, the DASS_D demonstrated 
acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .77 to .94 across the 7 times it 
was administered in this study).  
2.3.3 Subjective ratings 
Participants rated the subjective qualities of their endorsed image, associated memory, 
and associated cognitions on three sets of items assembled for the present study: Image Items, 
Memory Items, and Associated Cognitions Items. These items were empirically-derived and, 
wherever possible, adapted from previous studies (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 2011).  
2.3.3.1 Image Items (Appendix F) were administered (a) at the pre-IR session, following 
the Imagery segment of the Waterloo Images and Memories Interview (WIMI; Moscovitch et al., 
2011) and (b) at each of the followup sessions (see Appendix B). The rationale for not 
administering the Image items immediately following the intervention (i.e., post-IR) was that 
such imagery typically occurs spontaneously with relatively variable content in naturalistic 
settings; thus, we reasoned that participants would initially need to experience the occurrence of 
the “transformed” image spontaneously in their naturalistic social settings in the week following 
the intervention in order to report on and rate their characteristics in the Image items. On a 5-
point scale from 1 (very little or not at all) to 5 (extremely), participants rated their responses to 
items across the following categories: 
(1) How real the image seemed. 
(2) Ability to mentally change the contents of the image. 
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(3) How much embarrassment and shame they felt about aspects of the self that were 
represented in the image. 
(4) Influence and meaning of the image on their perception of self, others, and the world in 
general (e.g., “The mental image influences how I view myself.”) 
 
2.3.3.2 Memory Items (Appendix G). Beginning at the pre-IR session and then in each 
subsequent session, on a 5-point scale from 1 (very little or not at all) to 5 (extremely), 
participants rated their responses to items across the following categories: 
(1) Emotional impact of the memory. Using three individual items (how intense, how 
negative, and how anxious), participants rated how they felt while remembering the 
event.  
(2) Influence and meaning of the event (e.g., “The memory was of an event that I am 
embarrassed, ashamed, or otherwise don’t feel very good about;” “This event influenced 
how I view myself.”) 
(3) Differentiation of prior self and current self (i.e., 2 items, “I ‘identify’ with the person I 
was at the time of the event (i.e., I feel like I am similar now to the person I was then),” 
and “I no longer ‘identify’ with the person I was at the time of the event.”). These two 
items, scaled from 1-5 were developed for the present study. As a two-item composite 
scale, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from poor (.51) to acceptable (.84) across the 6 times the 
items were administered, so rather than using a composite of these items, they were 
analyzed separately. 
(4) Perceived empowerment (i.e., “The memory of this event is imbued with a sense of 
powerlessness,” and “recalling the memory now, I feel a sense of empowerment.”). These 
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two items were developed for the present study. When combined into a 2-item composite 
measure, alphas ranged from unusually poor (-.15) to acceptable (.73) across 
administrations. Given the relatively poor reliability of the composite measure, each item 
was analyzed separately.  
(5) Changes to compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance towards self and others. (e.g. “I feel 
compassion towards the other people who were part of the memory.”). The individual 
items for each construct were measured on a scale of 1-5. Across the 6 administrations in 
the study, the 3-item composite scale (with a possible range of 3-15) produced 
Cronbach’s alphas for self in the memory ranging from .41 to .83, and for others in the 
memory ranging from .70 to .93. Because these items did not generally demonstrate 
adequate reliability as a composite measure, they were each analyzed individually. 
The Memory Items set was administered (a) at pre-IR, following the Memory segment of the 
WIMI, (b) at post-IR, immediately following the intervention, and (c) at each of the followup 
sessions, as outlined in Appendix B.  
2.3.3.3 Associated Cognitions Items (Appendix H). Using a 100-point scale, participants 
rated the strength of belief in the idiosyncratic ‘associated cognitions’ (i.e., automatic thought 
and core beliefs about self, others, and the world) identified within the Associated Cognitions 
Supplement (ACS) to the WIMI. Specifically, they rated the extent to which they believed each 
of the target cognitions; that is, how true or likely it seemed to them at the present time. The 
Associated Cognitions Items set was administered (a) at the pre-IR session, (b) at post-IR 
following the intervention (c) at WL1 and WL2 (for participants in the WL condition), and (d) at 
each of the two followup sessions (see Appendix B). Item and/or instructional wording varied 
slightly as appropriate across administration time points. 
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2.3.3.4 Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS; Forman, et al., 2011; Appendix I). The DDS is a new 
measure of cognitive defusion, which is defined by the authors as the “ability to achieve 
psychological distance from internal experiences such as thoughts and feelings” (Forman et al., 
2011). Participants rated on a scale from 0 (Not at all) to 5 (Very much) the extent to which they 
were able to defuse from 10 different kinds of internal experiences (e.g., feelings of anger or 
thoughts about one’s future). The questionnaire is preceded by a detailed instruction set so as to 
ensure understanding of the target construct by participants. The scale is composed of 10 items 
and has a 2-item optional social anxiety supplement (which addresses anxiety about group 
situations and anxiety about one-on-one situations). Findings from the initial validation study 
(Forman et al., 2011) indicated that the DDS items all load onto one factor and that the measure 
demonstrates good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .83) and strong convergent and 
discriminant validity (i.e., stronger associations with other measures of defusion and weaker 
associations with related but conceptually distinct constructs such as mindful awareness and 
acceptance). In the present study, an additional 3 items were added, for which participants used 
the same scale to rate the extent of their defusion from the specific, idiosyncratic core beliefs 
associated with their recurrent image (as identified in the Associated Cognitions Supplement). 
Instructions for these items were as follows: “Based on the definition of defusion above, please 
rate each of your own thoughts/beliefs for how much you are in a state of defusion from the 
thought as you experience it. That is, how much you achieve internal distance from the thought.” 
The DDS was administered at each time point, with the 3 study-specific items being 
administered following the WIMI and thereafter. In the present study, overall/general DDS 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .75 to .90) across 
7 administrations. However, the 2 social anxiety items demonstrated poor-to-acceptable internal 
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consistency as a composite measure, with Cronbach’s alphas from .31 to .81. Likewise, a 
composite of defusion from associated cognitions demonstrated a range of reliabilities, from 
poor to very good (.59 to .87). Hence, the overall/general DDS was analyzed as a composite 
scale but all items examining defusion from two aspects of SA experience and three types of core 
beliefs were analysed individually. 
2.4 Experimental Procedures 
2.4.1 Overview. Please see the Timeline (Appendix A) for a visual representation of 
procedure sequencing.     
2.4.2 Imagery rescripting intervention. In the present study, IR was administered as a 
single-session intervention based on published guidelines from prior research (Arntz & 
Weertman, 1999, Wild et al., 2007 & 2008). Here, as in Nilsson, Lundh, and Viborg (2012), 
cognitive restructuring (CR) exercises were not included as part of the IR protocol. Using the 
information obtained from the WIMI and ACS, the experimenter-therapist (SGR) conducted a 
three-phase ‘rescripting’ of imagery pertaining to a specific event in memory – in this case, the 
memory associated with the content of recurrent negative imagery. In preparation, the participant 
is informed that the experimenter-therapist will be turned slightly away from them and, thus, is 
encouraged not to have to maintain eye contact with the therapist during the imagery procedures. 
Participants are instructed either to close their eyes or gaze towards the floor. In phase 1, 
participants are asked to recount the memory from the point of view of their self at the time of 
the event (i.e., the “prior self”). The participant is then directed (and, if necessary, reminded) to 
describe the scene in detail using the first person (e.g., “I am standing at the front of the class”), 
conveying as much detail as they can recall, including characteristics of the environment, others 
present, and their own feelings and thoughts, as well as the sequence of events. Once this is 
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complete, phase 2 begins, in which the participant observes the scene from the perspective of the 
current self (i.e., the “current self”). In other words, they are asked to observe the scene as they 
would if they witnessed it as a bystander today. Participants are instructed to begin (or, in some 
cases, they spontaneously begin) to participate in the scene as their current self, doing whatever 
they feel needs to be done to make the outcome of the event “more positive or satisfying” for the 
prior self. These interventions may be interactive between prior and present self (e.g., “I look 
myself in the eyes and say, ‘Don’t worry if you screwed up. You’re a great kid. This event 
means nothing in the big picture and you’re going to go on to do so much with your life!’”), or 
between the past or present self and others in the scene (e.g., confronting a bully or a critical 
parent). The participant intervenes in the scene until the negative valence of the event has 
transformed and/or dissipated to the satisfaction of both the current and prior self. In phase 3, the 
participant once again assumes the perspective of the prior self during the event and recounts the 
event again in the first person, this time incorporating the new content from phase 2. Finally, the 
researcher-therapist asks whether there is “anything more that the prior self would like from the 
current self, or to see changed in the event.” If there is, then participants are encouraged to enact 
this in the scene until they achieve a sense of satisfaction or completion. Once phase 3 has been 
completed, the researcher-therapist lets the participant know that the intervention is finished, 
acknowledges the participant’s hard work, and encourages the participant to take a few moments 
to “come back” into the present. Please see Appendix M for the scripted IR protocol that was 
implemented with participants.  
After the intervention was completed, participants were reminded of the image and 
embedded meanings they previously reported in session 2 on the ACS and were asked if, based 
on what they experienced/saw/learned during IR, they would alter or revise their original 
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cognitions about self, others, and the world, as recorded on the original IMC Summary Sheet, in 
any way. If the participant responded in the affirmative, the revised cognition was recorded on 
the Revised IMC Summary Sheet (see Appendix N). 
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3.0 Results 
3.1 Preliminary Analyses  
3.1.1 Descriptive statistics. Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 1. The 
average age of the participants was 19.52 (range = 18-22). Seventy percent of the sample was 
female and participants reported that they were from a variety of ethnic backgrounds (42% 
white/European, 30% Chinese, 18% other Asian, 4% black/Caribbean, and 4% Middle Eastern). 
As indicated in Table 1, chi-square tests and t-tests comparing distribution/values of descriptive 
variables across the two conditions (treatment and waitlist control) at the time of initial 
assessment revealed no significant differences.  
3.1.2 Change prior to IR. To evaluate whether symptom change occurred as a result of 
the image, memory, and core cognitions assessment, symptom ratings taken at initial intake were 
compared with symptom ratings following the WIMI and ACS. As expected, paired sample t-
tests showed no significant differences between these time points on strength of SAD (on the 
SPIN, p = .294; on the LSAS, p = .703) and depression (on the DASS_D, p = .289).Efficacy of 
IR 
As the first step in extending knowledge in the field regarding IR in the treatment of 
SAD, the efficacy of IR as a stand-alone, single-session intervention was examined, with 
symptoms on measures of SA (SPIN, LSAS-SR) and depression (DASS) as the primary 
dependent variables. A series of 2x3 repeated-measures (RM) ANOVAs were conducted, 
comparing no treatment (WL; n = 12-13) with active treatment (IR; n = 13-14) at pre-treatment 
(Pre-IR), post-treatment (Post-IR)/first waitlist questionnaire set (WL1), and one week followup 
(FU1)/second waitlist questionnaire set (WL2) time points. 
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3.2 Efficacy of IR 
3.2.1 Changes in SA symptoms. At the omnibus level, there was a main effect of Time, 
F(2, 44) = 7.13, p = .002, 2p = .25, and a significant Time x Condition interaction, F(2, 44) = 
10.27, p < .001, 2p = .32, for scores on the SPIN across the relevant time points. To follow up, 
change scores were computed by subtracting scores from target time points (i.e., post-IR and 
FU1 in the IR group, and WL1 and WL2 in the WL group) from pre-treatment scores, and 
independent-sample t-tests were conducted, comparing change scores across conditions
6
. These 
tests indicated significant group differences in the expected direction, with changes across time 
significantly greater in the IR relative to the WL condition from the pre-IR to post-IR/WL1 time 
points, t(24) = 2.69, p = .013; Cohen’s d = 1.10, and from the pre-IR to FU1/WL2 time points,  
t(23) = 4.40, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 1.84. A comparison of change from post-IR to FU1 in the IR 
condition with change from WL1 to WL2 in the WL condition (matched time intervals between 
the groups) showed a marginal difference that trended toward significance, t(23) = 1.89, p = 
.071.    
Changes in SA symptoms measured using the LSAS-SR, followed a similar, though not 
identical, pattern. The omnibus RM ANOVA showed a main effect of Time, F(1.591, 35.002) = 
11.45, p < .001, 2p = .34 using Greenhouse-Geisser corrected scores because the assumption of 
sphericity was violated, and a significant Time x Condition interaction, F(1.591, 35.002) = 5.38, 
p = .008, 2p = .20 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), for scores on the LSAS-SR across the 
relevant time points. As above, change scores were computed and independent-sample t-tests 
were used to compare magnitude of change across conditions. Results indicated that changes 
from pre-IR to post-IR/WL1 time points were not significantly different across conditions (p = 
.271) but scores were significantly decreased from pre-IR to FU1/WL2 in the IR group compared 
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to the WL group, t(23) = 2.92, p = .008; Cohen’s d = 1.22 (see Table 2 for means and standard 
deviations). There was no significant difference when comparing change on the LSAS from post-
IR to FU1 in the IR condition and WL1 to WL2 in the WL condition (p = .318). 
3.2.2 Changes in depression symptoms. The same series of analyses reported above was 
repeated using the DASS Depression subscale as the outcome variable. Omnibus results were 
nonsignificant for both the main effects of Time and the Time x Condition interaction. However, 
a priori hypotheses prompted us to complete independent-samples t-tests to compare change, 
and these showed a significant difference between change scores across the two conditions from 
pre-IR to post-IR, t(20) = 2.36, p < .028; Cohen’s d = 1.06, with larger change scores in the IR 
relative to the WL condition. This difference was no longer significant when pre-treatment to 
follow-up change scores were compared across conditions (p = .174), and change scores were 
not significantly different between post-IR and FU1 within the IR group and between WL1 and 
WL2 within the WL group (p = .513). 
3.3 Change processes during IR  
To further extend our understanding of IR and test specific hypotheses about the effects 
of IR over time on a variety of dependent variables, we conducted within-subjects repeated-
measures ANOVAs to examine changes over time reported by the full sample of participants 
who underwent IR (ns  from 16 - 24; lower ns are present in the core beliefs categories, as not all 
participants endorsed core beliefs about others or the world related to the image/memory). For 
these analyses, we included data from the participants who had initially been assigned to WL but 
later received IR, as well as those who were assigned to IR immediately. To justify merging 
these data into one set, we first inspected independent-samples t-tests comparing changes from 
pre-IR assessment to post-IR for all dependent variables between the two groups, which 
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indicated that they were statistically equivalent, with ts ≤ 1.12 and ps ≥ .275 (with the exception 
of significant changes in acceptance towards self in the memory, t(21) = 2.51, p = .02, and 
marginally significant changes in forgiveness of self, t(21) = 1.76, p = .093).  
Data from pre-IR, post-IR, FU1 and FU2 time points were merged from the two groups 
and used for within-subjects analyses. Dependent variables included participants’ subjective 
ratings across the Image Items, Memory Items, Associated Cognition Items, and the DDS. Time 
points for these analyses included pre-treatment (pre-IR), post-treatment (post-IR), one-week 
followup (FU1), and one-month followup (FU2). Where omnibus effects were significant, or 
trended towards significance (i.e., p < .10), followup t-tests were used to identify the specific 
time points across which significant changes occurred.  
In addition to these within-subject RM ANOVAs, between-subjects tests were computed 
in order to compare the treatment group’s post-IR scores with those of the waitlist group’s at the 
matched time point (WL1); below, this time point is abbreviated as “post-IR/WL1.” 
3.3.1 Changes to core beliefs. Of the 27 participants who completed IR, 27 (100%) 
identified a negative core belief about the self (CBS) associated with the image/memory; 25 
(93%) also identified a negative core belief about others (CBO), and 22 (82%) identified a 
negative core belief about the world (CBW). Following IR, 25/27 (93%) CBSs, 23/24 (96%) 
CBOs, and 22/22 (100%) had been altered. See Table 3 for a list of the participants’ reported 
associated cognitions at both pre- and post-IR, and Figure 6 for an illustration of the changes to 
strength of original and updated core beliefs over the course of the study.         
Analyses revealed that participants’ ratings of the strength (on a scale of 0-100) of their 
negative core beliefs about self (CBS), others (CBO), and the world (CBW) associated with their 
images and corresponding memories all decreased significantly with IR. Specifically, for CBS, 
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the omnibus RM ANOVA was significant, F(1.916, 38.329) = 10.00,  p < .001, 2p = .33 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), and followup t-tests indicated significantly lower strength of 
CBS from pre-IR to post-IR, M = -25.19 (SD = 31.67), t(26) = 4.13, p < .001, which continued to 
differ from pre-IR to FU1, M = -19.09 (SD = 24.09), t(21) = 3.72, p = .001, and FU2, M = -18.00 
(SD = 29.16), t(24) = 3.09, p = .005. In term of the maintenance of CBS changes, “rebound” of 
symptoms was marginally significant from post-IR to FU1, M = 9.09 (SD = 24.09), t(21) = 1.59, 
p = .09; however, strength of CBS did not differ at FU1 and FU2 (p = .499), indicating that 
whatever gains were maintained by 1-week FU carried over through the following weeks without 
significant rebound. However, a comparison of scores from post-IR to FU2 indicated that 
rebound was significant at 1-month followup relative to post-treatment, M = 7.29 (SD = 17.21), 
t(24) = 2.09, p = .047. A between-subjects comparison of the mean strength of CBS in the IR vs. 
WL conditions at post-IR/WL1 indicated significant differences in the expected direction, with 
the WL group reporting greater strength of CBS (M=67.69, SD=29.76) than the treatment group 
(M=43.57, SD=26.49), t(25)=2.22, p =.035. 
For CBO, the omnibus RM ANOVA was significant, F(1.900, 36.092) = 13.19, p < .001, 
2p = .41 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), and followup t-tests indicated significantly lower 
strength of CBO from pre-IR to post-IR, M = -27.92 (SD = 29.19), t(23) = 4.69, p < .001, which 
continued to differ from pre-IR to FU1, M = -27.14 (SD = 19.79), t(20) = 3.72, p < .001, and 
FU2, M = -19.55 (SD = 29.68), t(21) = 3.09, p = .006. Examining maintenance of changes at 
post-IR, there was no significant change from post-IR to FU1 (p = .426) or from FU1 to FU2 (p 
= .225), but there was marginally significant rebound across the full month, post-IR to FU2, M = 
7.73 (SD = 17.71), t(21) = 2.05, p = .053. Comparing mean strength of CBOs between the two 
conditions at post-IR/WL1 revealed, as expected, that the WL group reported greater strength of 
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CBO (M=66.36, SD=23.36) than the treatment group (M=48.46, SD=15.73), t(22)=2.23, p 
=.036). 
Finally, the omnibus RM ANOVA examining changes to CBW was significant, F(1.996, 
29.944) = 5.36, p = .01, 2p = .26 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), with followup t-tests showing 
that significant decrease to strength of CBW occurred from pre-IR to post-IR, M = -24.29 (SD = 
35.86), t(20) = 3.10, p = .006, and differed from pre-IR to FU1, M = -20.00 (SD = 25.44), t(17) = 
3.34, p = .004, but not from pre-IR to FU2, M = -11.91 (SD = 37.63), t(20) = 1.45, p = .163. 
Changes achieved at post-IR did not rebound significantly at FU1 (p = .23), and gains evident at 
FU1 were well-maintained until FU2 (comparing the two, p = .722). However, directly 
comparing scores immediately following intervention and at 1-month followup revealed a trend 
toward rebound from post-IR to FU2, M = 9.47 (SD = 24.60), t(18) = 1.68, p = .11. As expected, 
a t-test comparing strength of CBW between the two groups at post-IR/WL1 was significant, 
with stronger CBW in the WL condition (M=76.00, SD=22.21) than in the treatment condition 
(M=53.64, SD=18.04), t(19)=2.54, p =.020 
3.3.2 Changes in perceived powerlessness and empowerment of self. Perceived 
powerlessness of the self in the memory decreased significantly overall, omnibus RM ANOVA 
F(1.994, 41.880) = 14.54, p < .001, 2p = .41 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Followup t-tests 
showed that powerlessness decreased significantly from pre-IR to post-IR, M = -1.52 (SD = 
1.34), t(26) = 5.89, p < .001, and continued to differ significantly from pre-IR at both followup 
sessions, M = -1.78 (SD = 1.45), t(22) = 5.92, p < .001; and M = -1.58 (SD = 1.72), t(23) = 4.52, 
p < .001, for FU1 and FU2, respectively. This change was maintained without significant 
rebound from post-IR to both followup time points (ps = .365 and 1.00 for FU1 and FU2, 
respectively) and from FU1 to FU2 (p = .204). However, between-groups comparisons at post-
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IR/WL revealed that the effect of IR on participants’ ratings of self-powerlessness were not 
significantly different from that of WL (p = .132). 
Perceived empowerment of the self when reflecting on the memory increased 
significantly, with good maintenance of gains. The omnibus RM ANOVA was significant,  F(3, 
63) = 6.74, p = .001, 2p = .24, and followup t-tests showed that the sense of powerlessness 
decreased significantly from pre-IR to post-IR, M = 1.30 (SD = 1.49), t(26) = 4.24, p < .001, and 
continued to differ significantly from pre-IR at both followup sessions, M = 0.87 (SD = 1.42), 
t(22) = 2.93, p = .008; and M = 0.83 (SD = 1.61), t(23) = 2.54, p < .018, for FU1 and FU2, 
respectively. There was marginal rebound following intervention, with some decrease evident by 
FU1, M = 0.48 (SD = 1.20), t(22) = 1.91, p = .069, and FU2, M = 0.58 (SD = 1.47), t(23) = 1.94, 
p = .065. Gains maintained at 1-week FU did not decrease further at 1-month FU (p = .648). An 
independent-samples t-test comparing the effects of the control (M=1.58, SD=1.00) vs.  
treatment (M=3.00, SD=1.11) conditions on self-empowerment ratings at post-IR/WL showed 
that they differed significantly in the expected direction, t(24)=3.40, p =.002. 
3.3.4 Changes in differentiation of self. Differentiation of prior and current selves, 
measured individually, showed marginal-to-significant change during IR, but little maintenance 
of these gains at the followup time points. Ratings of how much participants ‘identified’ with 
their younger self who was the subject trended towards decreasing (RM ANOVA F (3, 63) = 
2.27, p = .089, 2p = .10). The inverse item – i.e.,, no longer identifying with that prior self – 
showed significant change, omnibus RM ANOVA F(3, 63) = 2.80, p = .047, 2p = .11. Followup 
t-tests showed significant differences between pre-IR and post-IR, M = 0.74 (SD = 1.53), t(26) = 
2.51, p = .019, and from post-IR to FU1, M = 0.65 (SD = 1.34), t(22) = 2.34, p = .029. There was 
no difference between scores at pre-IR and FU1 (p = .458), pre-IR and FU2 (p = .685), or FU1 
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and FU2 (p = .866). However, between-groups comparisons at post-IR/WL revealed that the 
effect of IR on participants’ ratings of self-differentiation were not significantly different from 
that of WL (ps = .949 and .454, for these two items, respectively). 
3.3.5 Changes in compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance. Compassion, forgiveness, 
and acceptance toward the self in the target memory all increased with IR. Repeated measures 
ANOVAs and followup t-tests were used to examine changes in these variables. As summarized 
in Table 4a, increases in compassion towards the self trended toward being significant at the 
omnibus level; while gains were not maintained at followups, self-compassion increased 
significantly immediately post-IR. Forgiveness and acceptance towards the self both increased 
significantly from pre- to post-IR and these gains were largely maintained, although some 
rebound was evident. Followup t-tests showed significant increases from pre- to post-IR and 
continued differences from pre-IR to both FU1 and FU2, with no decrease from FU1 to FU2. 
Comparing means from post-intervention with both followups, some rebound from initial gains 
was evident. Examining comparisons between conditions using independent-samples t-tests 
revealed that participants who had received IR showed increased compassion, forgiveness, and 
acceptance towards the self in the memory compared to those on the waitlist (see Table 4b). 
Similarly, compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance toward others who were part of the 
memory increased significantly during the study. Change in compassion towards others was 
maintained without significant rebound at either followup, while changes forgiveness and 
acceptance towards others had some rebound from post-IR at 1-week and 1-month followups, as 
outlined in Table 4a. T-tests comparing means between conditions showed that, compared to 
WL, those who received IR had significantly higher compassion and acceptance, and marginally 
higher forgiveness, toward others in the memory (see Table 4b). 
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3.3.6 Changes in defusion. Propensity to ‘defuse’ from one’s negative emotions was 
hypothesized to increase as a result of IR. Three categories of internal experience were 
examined: general/overall defusion (spanning a variety of negative internal experiences), as 
measured by the DDS, defusion from social anxiety-relevant internal experience, as measured by 
the two supplemental items of the DDS, and defusion from negative core beliefs associated with 
target image/memory (three additional items generated for the current study).  
General/overall defusion (10 items, rated on a scale of 0-5, for a total range of 0-50) 
increased over the course of the study, as indicated by the outcomes of the omnibus RM 
ANOVA, F(3, 60) = 9.09, p < .001, 2p = .31. Followup t-tests revealed that significant change 
occurred from pre-IR to post-IR, M = 7.27 (SD = 9.22), t(25) = 4.02, p < .001, and continued to 
differ from pre-IR at FU1, M = 3.44 (SD = 4.80), t(22) = 4.33, p = .002, and FU2, M = 5.76 (SD 
= 7.91), t(24) = 3.64, p = .001. There was some rebound from post-IR to FU1, M = -3.91 (SD = 
6.77), t(21) = 2.71, p = .013, but significant increase again between FU1 and FU2, M = 2.36 (SD 
= 5.02), t(21) = 2.21, p = .038. Gains were maintained from post-IR to FU2 (p = .195). An 
independent-samples t-test comparing means for the control (M=24.23, SD=7.07) and treatment 
(M=29.23, SD=6.42) conditions indicated a marginal difference at post-IR/WL1, t(24)=1.89, p = 
.071. 
The item measuring defusion that was specific to concerns about being in a group social 
setting changed over the course of the study, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(3, 66) = 2.22, p = .094, 
2p = .09. Followup t-tests indicated that significant change occurred from pre-IR to post-IR, M = 
0.77 (SD = 1.48), t(25) = 2.65, p = .014, but from post-IR to FU1 there was marginally 
significant rebound, M = -0.50 (SD = 1.32), t(23)1.86, p = .076. While FU1 and FU2 ratings did 
not differ significantly (p = .377), FU2 scores showed some recovery from the initial rebound, as 
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they were not significantly different from scores at post-IR (p = .364), and were significantly 
higher than pre-IR ratings (M = 0.64, SD = 1.41, t(24)2.27, p = .033). An independent-samples t-
test comparing the two conditions at post-IR/WL demonstrated a significant difference in 
defusion from anxiety concerns related to group social settings, t(24)=2.34, p = .028, with mean 
defusion ratings for the control condition (M=2.46, SD=0.97) significantly lower than in the 
active treatment condition (M=3.39, SD=1.04). 
The item measuring defusion from anxiety related to one-on-one interactions also 
increased during the study, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(3, 66) = 4.31, p = .008, 2p = .16. Followup 
t-tests indicated that significant change occurred from pre-IR to post-IR, M = 0.96 (SD = 1.56), 
t(25) = 3.14, p = .004, but that this change was not maintained from post-IR to FU1 (p = .144) 
and that FU1 did not differ from FU2 (p = .328). However, by 1-month FU (FU2), defusion from 
concerns related to individual interactions had returned again to being significantly increased 
relative to pre-IR levels (M = 0.60, SD = 1.35, t(24) 2.22, p = .036) and not significantly different 
from either post-IR (p = .153) or FU1 (p = .328). An independent-samples t-test comparing the 
two conditions at post-IR/WL demonstrated a significant difference in defusion from anxiety 
concerns related to one-on-one interactions, t(24)=2.30, p = .030, with mean defusion ratings for 
the control condition (M=2.15, SD=1.28) significantly lower than in the active treatment 
condition (M=3.15, SD=0.90). 
Finally, I examined changes to defusion from idiosyncratic core beliefs (measured on a 
scale of 0-5 for each item individually) over the course of participation. Defusion from core 
beliefs about self (CBS) increased over the course of the study, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(3, 63) 
= 7.97, p<.001, 2p =.28. Followup t-tests showed significant increases from pre-IR to post-IR, 
M = 4.25 (SD = 4.42), t(19) = 4.30, p < .001, from pre-IR to FU1, M = 2.17 (SD = 3.09), t(17) = 
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2.97, p = .009, and from pre-IR to FU2, M = 3.50 (SD = 4.53), t(21) = 3.62, p = .002. There was 
significant rebound from post-IR to FU1, M = -0.73 (SD = 1.16), t(21) = 2.94, p = .008, and FU1 
did not differ from FU2 (p = .126), while at FU2, scores did not differ significantly from post-IR 
(p = .116). An independent-samples t-test revealed that at post-IR/WL1, participants who had 
received IR (M=3.15, SD=1.28) reported significantly greater defusion from CBS than those who 
were randomized to WL (M=2.08, SD=1.19), t(24)=2.22, p = .036. 
Likewise, defusion from core beliefs about others (CBO) showed change over the course 
of participation, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(3, 57) = 3.36, p=.025, 2p =.15. Followup t-tests 
showed significant increases from pre-IR to post-IR, M = 1.18 (SD = 1.65), t(21) = 3.36, p =.003, 
but non-significant change from pre-IR to FU1 (p = .009) and a marginal difference between pre-
IR and FU2, M = 0.73 (SD = 1.91), t(21) = 1.79, p =.088. There was significant rebound from 
post-IR to FU1, M = -0.65 (SD = 1.31), t(19) = 2.22, p = .039 and ratings did not change 
significantly from FU1 to FU2 (p = .309); at FU2, scores did not differ significantly from post-
IR (p = .204). For this measure, an independent-samples t-test revealed no significant difference 
between conditions at the post-IR/WL1 time points (p = .261) 
Defusion from core beliefs about the world (CBW) also changed, omnibus RM ANOVA, 
F(3, 48) = 6.24, p=.001, 2p =.28. Followup t-tests showed significant increases from pre-IR to 
post-IR, M = 1.45 (SD = 1.85), t(19) = 3.51, p = .002, and from pre-IR to FU1, M = 0.94 (SD = 
1.47), t(17) = 2.72, p = .015, and from pre-IR to FU2, M = 0.95 (SD = 1.47), t(19) = 2.89, p = 
.009, but not  from FU1 to FU2 (p = .579). . Participants who had received IR (M=1.70, 
SD=1.06) reported significantly greater defusion from core beliefs about the world than 
participants on the WL (M=2.08, SD=1.19) at the comparable time point, t(19) =2.95, p =.008. 
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3.3.7 Changes in imagery qualities. Changes in imagery characteristics/qualities were not 
rated immediately following the intervention, but at pre-treatment and again at the two followup 
sessions, as described in the Measures section, above. Thus, no between-subjects tests were 
conducted on these variables. Ratings of how real the image seemed (on a scale from 1-5) 
decreased over the course of the study, Omnibus RM ANOVA, F(2, 46) = 4.48, p = .020, 2p = 
.16. Within-subjects t-tests examining changes from pre-IR to each of the followup sessions 
showed significant decreases at FU1, M = -.64 (SD = 1.29), t(24) = 2.49, p = .020, and 
continuing, although marginal, changes from pre-IR to FU2, M = -.60 (SD = 1.56), t(24) = 1.93, 
p = .066. There was no significant rebound from FU1 to FU2 (p = .704). 
Analyses indicated, further, that participants’ ability to manipulate contents of the image 
(single item, scaled from 1-5) increased over the course of the study, Omnibus RM ANOVA, 
F(2, 46) = 4.26, p = .017, 2p = .16. Within-subjects t-tests comparing pre-IR to each of the 
followup sessions showed significant increases from pre-IR to FU1, M = .84 (SD = 1.34), t(24) = 
3.13, p = .005, and from pre-IR to FU2, M = .76 (SD = 1.72), t(24) = 2.22, p = .036. There was 
no significant rebound from FU1 to FU2 (p = .461). 
Participants also rated their embarrassment and shame about the aspects of the self that 
were represented in the image (on a scale from 1-5). These scores decreased significantly during 
the study, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(2, 46) = 12.95, p < .001, 2p = .36. Within-subjects t-tests 
comparing pre-IR to each of the followup sessions showed that shame and embarrassment 
represented in the image decreased at FU1, compared to pre-IR, M = -1.16 (SD = .90), t(24) = 
6.46, p < .001, and these changes remained significant from pre-IR to FU2, M = -.84 (SD = 
1.43), t(24) = 2.93, p = .007. Change was maintained from FU1 to FU2, with no significant 
rebound (p = .664). 
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Finally, among hypothesized changes to imagery qualities as a result of IR, we examined 
the extent to which participants perceived the image to influence their perception of self, others, 
and the world (on a scale from 1-5). Perception of self in relation to the image changed 
significantly during the study, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(2, 46) = 7.41, p = .002, 2p = .24. 
Followup t-tests comparing scores at pre-IR versus FU1 and FU2 showed that influence on self-
perception decreased significantly from pre-IR at both FU1, M = -.88 (SD = 1.30), t(24) = 3.38, p 
= .002, and FU2, M = -.76 (SD = 1.23), t(24) = 3.08, p = .005. Change was maintained from FU1 
to FU2, as there was no significant difference between scores at these time points. (p = .870).  
Changes in the extent to which the image influenced participants’ views of others were 
marginally significant, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(1.558, 35.825) = 3.43, p = .058, 2p = .13 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Followup paired-samples t-tests comparing scores at pre-IR 
with FU1 and FU2 showed marginal decrease from pre-IR to both FU1, M = -.48 (SD = 1.42), 
t(24) = 1.69, p = .103, and FU2, M = -.56 (SD = 1.53), t(24) = 1.83, p = .080. This marginal 
change was maintained from FU1 to FU2, as there was no significant difference between scores 
at these time points (p = .260). The extent to which imagery influenced participants’ views of the 
world in general did not change over the course of the study (omnibus RM ANOVA, p = .179). 
3.3.8 Changes in memory qualities. It was hypothesized that changes to the affective 
qualities of the target memory might occur with IR. Participant ratings of anxiety evoked by the 
memory (measured on a scale of 1-5) decreased significantly over the course of the study, 
omnibus RM ANOVA, F(3, 60) = 18.26, p < .001, 2p = .48. Followup t-tests were performed to 
identify where the differences occurred. These tests showed significant decreases in anxiety 
associated with the memory from pre-IR to post-IR, M = -1.39 (SD = 1.17), t(25) = 6.04, p < 
.001, and continued differences from pre-IR to FU1, M = -1.65 (SD = 1.07), t(22) = 7.40, p < 
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.001, and FU2, M = -1.63 (SD = 1.28), t(23) = 6.22, p < .001. There was no significant rebound 
from post-IR to FU1 (p = .246), or from FU1 to FU2 (p = .840), nor was there a significant 
change between post-IR and FU2 (p = .342). However, a between-subjects comparison revealed  
no significant difference in how much anxiety was evoked by the memory across the two 
conditions at post-IR (treatment group) and WL1 (control group), p = .588. 
A single-item rating of global negative emotion associated with the target memory were 
made by participants at the relevant time points (using a scale of 1-5 to rate the statement, 
“While remembering the event, the emotions I felt were negative.”), and analyses showed 
significant decreases across the course of the study, omnibus RM ANOVA, F(3, 60) = 16.87, p < 
.001, 2p = .46. Followup t-tests showed that significant decreases occurred from pre-IR to post-
IR, M = -1.67 (SD = 1.36), t(26) = 6.37, p < .001, and continued to change relative to pre-IR at 
both FU1, M = -1.70 (SD = 1.30), t(22) = 6.28, p < .001, and FU2, M = -1.96 (SD = 1.15), t(22) = 
8.18, p < .001. There was no significant rebound from post-IR to FU1 (p = 1.00) or FU2 (p = 
.266). Between-subjects t-tests revealed that control participants reported that significantly 
higher negative emotion was evoked by the memory at post-IR/WL1, (M=4.08, SD=1.08) than 
those in the treatment condition (M=2.64, SD=1.15), t(24)=3.27, p = .003. 
Participants also rated the intensity of emotion associated with the memory (on a scale 
from 1-5); here, too, significant decreases were evident across the study, omnibus F(3, 60) = 
8.61, p < .01, 2p = .30. Followup t-tests showed marginal decreases in ratings of negative affect 
from pre-IR to post-IR, M = -.52 (SD = 1.53), t(26) = 1.76, p = .09, and continued differences 
from pre-IR at FU1, M = -1.17 (SD = 1.27), t(22) = 4.44, p < .01, and FU2, M = -1.00 (SD = 
1.21), t(22) = 3.98, p < .01. There was marginal rebound from post-IR to both FU1 and FU2, M 
= .39 (SD = 1.08), t(22) = 1.74, p = .095 and M = .48 (SD = 1.12), t(22) = 2.04, p = .053, 
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respectively, although ratings at FU1 and FU2 did not differ significantly from one another (p = 
.329). Despite these within-groups analyses showing decreased intensity of emotion evoked by 
the memory, a between-subjects comparison revealed a nonsignificant difference in emotion 
intensity between participants assigned to IR and those assigned to WL at post-IR/WL1 (p = 
.169). 
3.4 Mechanisms of Treatment Efficacy 
To examine which of our process variables may be most related to symptom changes that 
occurred as a result of IR, and with an eye toward developing future hypothesis-driven studies 
that would be designed in a manner that could measure treatment mediators in IR, we ran a series 
of correlations between symptom change scores (on the SPIN) from intake to one week followup 
and change scores from pre-treatment to post-treatment on our component process variables 
(strength of core beliefs about self, others, and the world; compassion, forgiveness, and 
acceptance towards self, and towards others, in the target memory; defusion generally, related to 
SAD, and from core beliefs; perceived empowerment in the memory; differentiation of historical 
and current selves; qualities of the image; and qualities of the memory)
7
. No specific hypotheses 
were advanced.  
Findings are summarized in Table 5, in which Pearson’s rs are reported for correlations 
between variables with normal distributions and Spearman’s rhos are reported for correlations 
where normality assumptions were violated for either of the variables. Strength of negative core 
beliefs about Self, Others, and the World all decreased during IR (see above), but changes in 
CBS uniquely demonstrated a strong positive correlation with changes in SPIN symptoms, r(21) 
= .52, p = .012. Conversely, changes in CBOs and CBWs were not significantly associated with 
symptom change during IR, rs(19) = .20, p = .384; and r(15) = -.02, p = .942, respectively.  
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In a similar vein, we explored whether changes to compassion, forgiveness, and 
acceptance in the target memory predicted symptom change. Indeed, changes in the self-related 
variables were associated with SA symptom changes, with compassion, r(20) = -.50, p=.019), 
forgiveness, r(20) = -.46, p < .030), and acceptance, r(20) = -.36, p=.098, all correlating 
substantially with symptom change (although the correlation with acceptance toward self only 
trended towards being significant). In contrast, the changes in strength of compassion, 
forgiveness, and acceptance towards others in the memory did not predict symptom change, 
r(20) = -.07, p = .76; r(20) = .14, p = .54; and r(20) = -.18, p = .41, respectively.  
We explored the remainder of the relevant outcome variables as possible predictors of 
symptom change. Of the following, none significantly predicted decreases in SPIN scores (with 
the exception of defusion from SAD concerns pertaining to one-on-one social contexts and 
identification with prior self; as shown in Table 5): image qualities (how real it seemed, 
participants’ abilities to change aspects of the image, how much it represented of negative 
aspects of self, influenced participants’ views of self, caused mood to worsen, and how much 
participants could control influence of image on mood), memory qualities (sense of 
empowerment of the self in the memory, extent of differentiation between current and prior self 
in memory, intensity of emotion elicited by memory, extent of anxiety elicited by memory), 
defusion (in general, from SAD-relevant cognitions, and from core beliefs).  
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4.0 Discussion 
4.1 Efficacy of Imagery Rescripting: Symptom Reduction 
This study examined a single-session IR intervention for treating social anxiety. The first 
set of analyses tested my primary hypotheses that immediately following the intervention and at 
1-week and 1-month followups, IR would lead to significant decreases in symptoms of social 
anxiety (see Figure 1) and depression compared to pre-intervention, and that IR would 
significantly outperform WL at post-intervention and 1-week followup. Results from between-
subjects analyses demonstrated that participants in the active treatment condition experienced 
reduced SA symptoms in comparison to participants in the WLcontrol condition. These effects 
were evident immediately following intervention on one measure (the SPIN) but not the other 
(the LSAS-SR); large effects, however, were evident across both measures at 1-week followup, 
and within-subjects analyses showed maintenance of gains at 1-month (between-subjects 
comparisons were not available for the longer followup time point). These results support earlier 
findings that IR is generally efficacious in reducing SA symptoms, over and above passage of 
time or inclusion in a treatment study after 1 week (Lee & Kwon, 2013; Nilsson et al., 2012; 
Wild et al., 2008). Adding to these previous findings, the 1-month followup in the present study 
demonstrated, for the first time in the literature, that gains in treating SA symptoms made 
through IR alone are very well-maintained.  
Many participants in this study conveyed that they had gained new insight into their 
ongoing anxiety when they identified the autobiographical source of recurrent imagery, as well 
as the nature and meaning of such impactful autobiographical memory (from the WIMI and the 
ACS). However, given that there was no significant difference in self-reported symptoms of SA 
or depression following those activities, it seems that insight alone into the underlying memory 
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and corresponding meaning does not, in and of itself, facilitate symptom change. This insight 
regarding the contents of relevant imagery, cognitions, and memory, and their interconnected 
influence on anxiety activation makes it possible to individualize the model of anxiety depicted 
in Figure 2. Creating such an idiosyncratic model may be a helpful platform for change, and, 
following from Figure 2, targeting change within the idiodsyncratic memory content “upstream” 
from beliefs and assumptions is what leads to the changes to beliefs and assumptions and reduces 
symptoms. 
Depression symptoms were reduced immediately following IR relative to WL, but this 
difference was not consistently maintained when inspected more carefully over time both 
between conditions and even within the IR condition. One interpretation of this finding is that the 
effects of IR are quite specific to SAD-relevant content, as we see substantial change in SAD 
symptoms as a result of IR, but little change in depression symptoms (despite depression often 
being comorbid with SAD; e.g., Stein, Fuetsch, Müller, Höfler, Lieb, & Wittchen, 2001). It is 
also possible that the magnitude of impact on SAD symptoms would need to be greater, or 
experienced for a longer amount of time, before symptoms of depression would effectively 
decrease. However, given that relatively few participants in the sample endorsed clinically 
significant levels of depression, the question of impact of decreases to SAD on depression might 
better be addressed in a sample with higher rates of depression prior to treatment. 
4.2 Effects of Imagery Rescripting on Specific Therapeutic Factors 
4.2.1 Changes in negative core beliefs. I proposed that core beliefs associated with the 
target imagery and memory would be altered and/or decreased in strength after IR. As for 
alterations to core beliefs, I hypothesized that the content of the target negative cognitions would 
be revised following IR in a manner that assimilates new information derived from the 
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intervention. Indeed, a very high proportion of negative core beliefs identified prior to 
intervention, which were related to the recurrent image and memory, were revised following IR, 
suggesting that IR is an effective technique for helping clients make changes to deeply held 
cognitions that are often resistant to change (e.g., Beck, 2006; Padesky & Greenberger, 1995; 
Wenzel, 2012).  I also hypothesized that, in addition to altering the content of original core 
beliefs associated with the memory and image, the strength with which participants held the 
original core beliefs would decrease; that is, that the original negative beliefs would be held with 
much less conviction than they had been prior to IR. These hypotheses were supported, as 
within-subjects comparisons showed significant reductions to strength of negative core beliefs 
across all three domains (self, others, and the world) following IR, and between-groups 
comparisons showed negative core beliefs to be held with less strength in participants who had 
undergone IR vs. those who were randomized to the waitlist. Indeed, at 1-week and 1-month 
followups, strength of participants’ beliefs in all three domains was significantly reduced relative 
to pre-treatment, notwithstanding  some degree of rebound that occurred across domains.  These 
results support the notion that IR is a powerful method for accessing, addressing, and reducing 
negative core beliefs across theoretically (and practically) relevant domains of self, others, and 
the world. This technique would likely be most beneficial, with gains maintained longer-term, if 
it were administered within a longer course of therapy and not as a stand-alone treatment. Within 
such a therapeutic context, continued solidification of gains would be optimally supported. 
4.2.2 Differentiation of current and prior self. It was hypothesized that differentiation of 
the current self from the historical self at the time of the target memory (“prior self”) would 
occur as a result of IR, as the technique forces the two “selves” into focus – and even dialogue, 
in most cases – a process that would seem to highlight their distinctions. In this domain, 
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differences were evident between pre- and post-treatment scores, but not from pre-treatment 
scores to either of the followup time points, nor were there between-group differences in the 
effects of IR vs. WL on self-differentiation following the intervention or WL. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that the aspects of self at play in the IR experience are brought into 
contrast with each other not only chronologically – that is, current self as opposed to historical 
self – but also symbolically, at a deeper level that is imbued with personal meaning. It has been 
my clinical observation that subjects bring a “strong” version of their present self to the role, 
while the prior self – by virtue of being the subject of the traumatic social event – is a 
representation of the individual at their self-perceived weakest or most vulnerable. In fact, the 
differential strength may be a demand characteristic of the task itself, given that subjects are 
asked to intervene on behalf of their prior self.  For example, one of my individual therapy 
clients (not a participant in the present study) who completed IR as part of treatment, in 
processing her experience of IR at a following session spontaneously referred to the present self 
as her “higher self.” Therefore, there may be dimension(s) beyond chronicity on which the two 
versions of the self are contrasted and which result in therapeutic gain, such as strong vs. weak, 
rescuer vs. victim, able to give vs. with nothing to give, etc. Furthermore, although it is 
seemingly useful, “creating” two entities out of one is an artificial exercise, which is done to 
draw out the qualities of an historical self which is contextualized by the target memory. Hence, 
it seems possible that while the distinction of a prior self from a current self is apparent in the 
context of an intervention that characterizes them as unique, the contrast between the “two 
selves” may become less marked with time following IR. Indeed, ongoing differentiation of 
chronologically distinct selves may not be particularly important to maintain gains; that is, there 
may not be any reason the subject should need to see his or her current self as someone different 
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from their earlier self. In hindsight, I have wondered if IR might exert the therapeutic effect of 
assimilating the current/strong/rescuing self with the prior/weak/victimized self, rather than 
differentiating the parts of the self per se. However, I did not measure self-assimilation in the 
current study and this question is one that ought to be examined in future research. 
Further to the topic of differentiation, another hypothesized outcome of IR was an 
increase in perceived self-empowerment associated with the target memory. This hypothesis was 
supported, and the increase in empowerment was maintained at both followup time points within 
the IR condition and in the IR group relative to the WL group. While not examined in this study, 
it would seem relevant to understand to what extent empowerment drives the effect of 
differentiation. The short half-life of the differentiation of the present and prior selves within the 
IR condition makes sense, too, in light of the findings on compassion, forgiveness, and 
acceptance of the self in the memory: as the historical self is regarded with increased 
compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance, differentiation from that self may not be 
therapeutically necessary.      
4.2.3 Compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance towards self and others.  I hypothesized 
that compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance towards the self and towards others at the time of 
the memory would increase as a result of IR, and these hypotheses were supported. In keeping 
with the pattern of results thus far, participants reported increases to these variables immediately 
following intervention, and ratings made at both followups continued to be significantly higher 
than at pre-treatment. However, the effect was greatest immediately post-treatment, with some 
rebound occurring at the followup time points. Between-group comparisons also revealed that 
participants’ compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance toward self and others increased 
significantly post-IR relative to post-WL.  
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 When initially recalling the distressing memories, subjects often conveyed a sense of 
disgust, shame, disappointment, or hard-heartedness towards themselves in the memory. An 
important marker of the therapeutic shift during rescripting was a qualitative softening towards 
the prior self. In fact, for a therapist leading clients through IR, moment-by-moment judgments 
about whether the they are engaging in the rescripting in an optimally helpful way is determined 
in part by an implicit or intuitive monitoring of compassion, forgiveness, and/or acceptance (as 
relevant to the idiosyncratic memory). In some sense, these variables could be considered 
mechanistic ingredients of the therapy that help to guide the therapist to individualize and 
customize the intervention for each subject and determine when the subject’s memory is 
considered “resolved.” This would be an important point to clarify in future research, particularly 
if trials include multiple therapists and/or relevant verbal content is assessed by observers. 
4.2.4 Cognitive defusion. I hypothesized that IR would lead to an increase in internal 
distance from emotions and thoughts in general, as well as an increase in defusion with respect to 
participants’ salient socially anxious cognitions and idiosyncratic negative core beliefs. This 
hypothesis was supported, as participants reported increased defusion in all of these areas, and 
these gains were more or less maintained at 1-week and 1-month followups. Moreover, IR 
participants reported significant or marginally significant benefits across many of the defusion 
measures relative to those assigned to WL. This set of findings is timely, in light of current 
interest in defusion as a central mechanism of CBT and mindfulness/acceptance approaches to 
anxiety treatment. It also provides some information about the cognitive processes that are 
implicated in IR. Specifically, reflecting on the event and experiencing the shifts of perspective 
that are built into IR might help subjects achieve a sense of being separate from the internal 
phenomena of thoughts and feelings.  
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4.2.5 Imagery and memory qualities. As hypothesized, IR led to changes in relevant 
characteristics of the target imagery. In their subjective ratings, participants who received IR 
reported, following the intervention, that the image seemed less real; that they were more able to 
change aspects of the image in their mind; that they experienced less shame or embarrassment 
about aspects of the self represented in the image; and that the image had less influence over how 
they perceived themselves, others, and the world. All of these changes, evident at 1-week 
followup, were maintained with no significant rebound at 1-month followup, indicating that IR 
was effective at making lasting and therapeutic adjustments to the imagery and its negative 
impact. Within-subjects changes among participants in the IR group were also evident in the 
affective qualities of the memory that were measured as part of the study. Participants reported 
decreased anxiety, negative emotion, and intensity in association with the target memory 
immediately following IR; as with imagery changes, these decreases were maintained at both 1-
week and 1-month followups.  
4.3 Mechanisms of Treatment Efficacy.  
This series of analyses was exploratory, and while in hindsight the pattern of results 
supports my understanding of SAD, I had not entered this phase of analyses with specific 
hypotheses in mind. The question, here, rather than ‘which processes change as a result of IR,’ 
was, ‘which of the changes brought about by IR predicted reductions in SA symptoms?’ In the 
case of each of the hypothesized secondary outcomes reviewed above, there was some 
theoretical indication that the variables should be related to SA maintenance. Yet, even though 
all of the proposed variables were impacted by IR, it was not the case that changes in all areas 
were related to changes in SA symptoms, specifically. Hence, the final area of investigation of 
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this dissertation has implications for our understanding of SAD, over and above the findings 
regarding IR, per se.  
As we have seen, IR results in change across numerous variables: imagery qualities 
change and the subjective influence of the image decreases; negative affective qualities of the 
target memories decrease; negative core beliefs are weakened, and revised; objective distancing 
from negative emotion and cognition is achieved; and compassion, acceptance, and forgiveness 
are increased, both towards the self and others in the traumatic memory. However, only a distinct 
subset of these variables correlated with symptom change: expressly self-related constructs.  
4.4 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
4.4.1 Centrality of the self in cognitive models of social anxiety. Imagery is afforded a 
central role in the cognitive behavioural theory of maintenance of SAD, in which it is purported 
to exert a negative impact through the explicit content of the image, which then prompts 
behavioural response (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2004). Hence, one would expect that changes to 
relevant qualities of the image, such as how real the image seems or the extent to which it 
portrays negative aspects of self, should influence SA symptomatology (e.g., Hirsch et al., 2006). 
However, outcomes from this study did not support such a model, and hence (pending 
replication) give us reason to revisit the nature of the impact of images and pivotal negative 
memories in SA. It seems that the impact of anxiety imagery is best understood as being driven 
by  the semantic meaning about the self that is represented by it (e.g., Hackmann et al., 2000; 
Hackmann & Holmes, 2010), rather than by its explicit yet superficial sensory content per se. 
Further, the results of the present study indicate that semantic meaning most influential in SA 
maintenance is that which pertains to the self, rather than to beliefs about other people, or the 
world in general. That is, the locus of the threat underlying the anxiety is in the perceived nature 
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of the self, rather than an external source. Using an individual example from the present sample, 
changing beliefs such as “I am weak,” seems to decrease social anxiety more than correcting 
beliefs like “Other people are judgmental and look down on me,” or “The world is not fair.” 
This set of findings lends support to Moscovitch’s (2009) model of social anxiety which 
identifies specific perceived flaws in the self – rather than social situations, embarrassment, or 
negative evaluation  – as the core fear stimulus that drives symptoms.  As he suggests, 
misidentification or misconceptualization of the core fear that underlies social anxiety and 
requires therapeutic attention may help to account for the relatively modest efficacy of standard 
CBT protocols for treating SA (e.g. Davidson et al., 2004; Stangier, Heidenreich, Peitz, 
Lauterbach, & Clark, 2003). Therapists who aim to reduce symptoms by targeting the explicit 
content in the imagery or the social context in which the imagery is imbedded, rather than the 
self-relevant underlying meaning that the imagery represents, may be targeting the tip of the 
iceberg; ultimately, it is beliefs about the self per se that need to change in therapy for SAD. To 
this end, the explicit imagery content might best be thought of as an initial access point to the 
underlying meaning. 
4.4.2 Spontaneous vs. planned challenging of underlying cognitions. When therapists 
induce change in a top-down way during CBT by identifying assumptions and beliefs and 
challenging them based on their logical validity, it is assumed that doing so will facilitate 
affective change for the client. Indeed, there is good evidence that this can be helpful in 
improving SAD (e.g., Taylor, Woody, Koch, McLean, Paterson, & Anderson, 1997). However, 
while our clients tend to succeed in countering assumptions and beliefs, a disjunction between 
logical thought and underlying emotion – sometimes referred to as “knowing with the head but 
not knowing with the heart” (e.g., Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; Greenberg & Safran, 1984) – may 
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remain. In other words, our clients might logically know that their assumptions are incorrect but 
continue to feel as though they are true. It seems likely that the experiential nature of IR and, in 
particular, the spontaneous reappraisal processes that are generated by this intervention, help to 
bridge this “disconnection” by simultaneously activating different subsystems (e.g., Teasdale & 
Barnard, 1993) or structures within a broader network (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1986). It has been my 
observation that once the participant becomes accustomed to the experiential nature of IR, they 
are able to engage multiple modalities – emotional, rational, narrative, and even sensory – in the 
process. In the context of this experience, many participants spontaneously recognize and 
challenge deep assumptions or beliefs in a more integrated manner.  
In the present study, in contrast to the top-down approach of some cognitive techniques 
(for example, cognitive restructuring), core beliefs (CBs) were elicited prior to rescripting and 
then revisited at the end of the intervention. Identification and revisiting of CBs are not formal 
components of the rescripting itself; however, based on the experience from this study, I would 
recommend – for a number of reasons - that they be added to standard IR procedures, 
particularly if we are to consider IR a CBT technique (see below for further discussion on this 
topic). First, doing so serves a summarizing function for the client. In initially eliciting CBs via 
the image and corresponding memory, their meaning becomes explicit, their symbolism becomes 
more clearly defined, and their impact can be elucidated – all of which sets the stage for change. 
Second, in the process of rescripting, that initial meaning is altered, whether by achieving a 
different perspective on the initial meaning or generating new meaning altogether. At the 
conclusion of the rescripting, then, it is highly instructive and rewarding for clients to revisit 
those original beliefs and have the opportunity to revise them in light of the rescripting 
experience. The therapist only needs to provide some structure and coaching for this step but the 
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majority of subjects tend to identify revisions to content fairly readily. Finally, having 
knowledge of the idiosyncratic meaning encapsulated in the memory/image is helpful as the 
therapist guides the subject to resolution. For example, if the client does not spontaneously 
choose actions within the memory “scene” that address the core meanings, the therapist may 
guide her towards actions or reflections that do pertain to the core meaning – and in so doing, 
may render the intervention more effective. 
4.4.3 Imagery Rescripting: Is it CBT? A broader topic for discussion is whether, why, 
and how IR should be considered a cognitive behavioural technique. I refer the reader to 
Edwards’ (2007) review of the legacy of therapeutic techniques that led to imagery rescripting in 
its current form, in which he points out that multiple paradigm shifts have occurred in the field to 
set the stage for the approach used today. Indeed, it seems that one could find support for 
arguments for and against the inclusion of IR in the CBT toolbox based on its characteristics. As 
to ‘whether’ IR should be viewed as a CBT technique, my opinion is that it should. Why it 
should is, most obviously, because the available evidence about imagery in SAD – that it plays 
an important role in maintaining symptoms, that it can be traced to specific autobiographical 
events, and that it represents specific negative core beliefs and assumptions – corresponds to 
cognitive behavioural models of SAD and suggests that recurrent imagery and corresponding 
memories and meaning are important targets for therapy. It is also the case that the theoretical 
rationale for IR fits neatly with the cognitive models of SAD: starting with early CBT (e.g., 
Beck, 1976), the cornerstone of the theory across diagnoses has been the influence of 
maladaptive beliefs, which are influential precisely because they are not logical and are not 
bound to the present in a realistic way. Such maladaptive beliefs and assumptions derive from 
earlier learning, which may have been adaptive and appropriate at some time in the past, but 
 61 
 
which continue to influence the individual’s perceptions despite being out-of-date due to failures 
in updating in light of new information. This proposition is utterly embedded in IR, the goal of 
which is precisely to identify such instances of formative learning that influence the present, and 
to update the perspective and beliefs that were crystallized in learning at the time of the event. As 
such, IR also fits with the CBT model of anxiety treatment in important ways.  
On the other hand, there are significant divergences from what is ‘typical’ in most 
applications of CBT. For example, IR is experiential, demands in-the-moment discovery, and 
relies heavily on therapist engagement of nonspecific factors. It activates strong emotions. It is 
historical, and relies on the central premise that not only recalling the past but returning to it is 
important. It does not employ explicit contrasting of expectations with evidence or, really, rely at 
all on logic as a faculty for healing. And yet, within the broad swath of cognitive and cognitive-
behavioural proponents, we do find endorsement of such factors – for example, in the writings of 
Aaron Beck, Christine Padesky, and others. It is my own opinion that what most ties IR to CBT 
is the updating of meaning that it facilitates. And while knowledge of how best to incorporate IR 
into CBT, as well as the additive effects of IR to standard CBT for SAD, remain to be examined 
empirically, it seems evident that IR would enrich the extant body of CBT 
techniques/components by providing a tool that uses imagery in a novel application, that guides 
the therapist to use historical material in a beneficial and time-limited way, and that 
complements the emphasis on logic/rationality that is traditional in CBT. 
4.5Limitations 
 The present study has a number of limitations which may temper the strength of 
conclusions drawn on the basis of our results as well as the generalizability of the present 
findings. Even though the study sample consisted of participants with a clinical diagnosis of 
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SAD, it was not a treatment-seeking sample beyond the research context. Hence, this sample 
may differ from one drawn from a clinic or hospital treatment setting. However, severity of 
symptoms was stringently assessed and was in the clinical range on multiple measures for all 
participants. Similar to many treatment studies, participants were affected severely enough to 
merit diagnosis but functional impairment was not severe enough to preclude participation. 
Further, the participants were all enrolled in university, so the mean age was in young adulthood, 
and the age range was somewhat constrained. Moreover, all data were collected via self-report, 
precluding investigation of behavioural/observed outcomes. Further, some of the constructs were 
measured using items developed for this study which had not been previously validated. Poor 
reliability of some of these measures necessitated the analysis of single-item ratings rather than 
composite scales in certain cases. 
 There were also limitations to the study design. Most notably, the pre-post and waitlist 
control comparisons which were used neither permitted comparisons between IR and other 
empirically supported interventions, nor allowed for a stringent examination of treatment effects 
or underlying mechanisms. Moreover, the sample size was small, which may have led to some 
underpowered analyses. Another limitation of the present study was the use of only one 
therapist-researcher. Standardized protocols and semi-structured techniques were implemented 
throughout the study to promote consistency and to control for possible variations across 
participants. However, there was no way to control for nonspecific characteristics or biases of the 
therapist-researcher, which could have played a role in treatment outcomes. Although no change 
occurred prior to IR despite two 90-minute sessions, which locates the point of change at active 
treatment rather than nonspecific therapeutic contact, the use of a single therapist prevents us 
from drawing firm conclusions about IR as it may be administered from a sample of therapists.   
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Finally, it should be noted that the literature is not always precise in differentiating 
between intrusive recollections (i.e., spontaneous recollections of an autobiographical event), 
spontaneously occurring images, and the observer perspective on the self (e.g., Coles, Turk, 
Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001; Moscovitch et al., 2011; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998). In 
particular, the observer perspective on the self and the spontaneous, recurrent image of the self 
are hardly distinguishable and may in fact be separate descriptions of the same phenomenon. For 
example, both constructs describe seeing oneself in the mind’s eye when anxiety is aroused. The 
impression of the self based on this internal perception is negatively biased, and is theorized to 
prompt behavioural compensation. There are elements of the image that tend to stay the same 
across situations, but some elements may morph to accommodate details of the present context. 
There are some differences, as well: imagery is known to contain not only visual but other 
sensory information, or even a “felt sense,” whereas the observer perspective on the self is 
fundamentally visual; moreover, negative imagery may consist not only of self images but of 
other content as well. The hypothesis that these constructs overlap substantially enough to be 
considered a unitary construct remains to be examined empirically.  
4.6 Future Directions 
 There are numerous ways forward from the present study. To begin, the findings of the 
present study require replication – with different therapists, samples, and settings. The efficacy 
of IR when administered alone versus as part of a full course of CBT should also be ascertained, 
in order to measure its additive value to established empirically supported treatments. 
In addition, examining qualitative narratives from WIMI/ACS and IR sessions and from 
Cognition/Belief Summary forms would allow for a variety of novel and interesting questions to 
be explored (e.g., about qualities and themes of core beliefs, nature of changes to core beliefs 
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following IR, qualities of imagery and memories, active ingredients and predictors of IR 
success). The scope of this undertaking (i.e., coding and analyzing these data) exceeded current 
resources, but this would be a meaningful direction for future investigations of IR. 
 Future research might clarify possible refinements to the technique of IR for treating 
SAD. To begin, the IR protocol used in this study was based on available precedence in the 
literature, which requires identification and rescripting of a single historical memory 
corresponding to imagery content. However, in my observation of numerous administrations, it 
was not clear that the relevant memory needed to be of a single, specific event in order for an 
impactful rescripting experience to occur (and, at this point, there is also no empirical evidence 
to direct us one way or the other). Indeed, the findings of this study indicate that with IR we must 
focus on changing personal meaning via recollection and alteration of idiosyncratic, symbolic 
material. The verity and accuracy of recollection of the historical event may be all but irrelevant 
to the therapeutic task; it is the internal representation that is the ultimate target, and this 
representation is subjective, likely constructive, and may derive from either a single event or a 
series of events that have significant semantic overlap yet may have occurred over a longer 
period of time (see Conway, 2005). As an alternative to the current protocol which requires that a 
single event be identified, future research of IR might permit a more flexible definition of 
autobiographical memory events. For example, a recurrent event might provide an acceptable 
experience for rescripting, so long as a single episode could either be recalled or reconstructed 
from a series of similar events and the recollection is suitable to provide access to a rich meaning 
structure.  
Given the heterogeneity of symptom expression amongst high socially anxious (HSA) 
individuals (Heimberg, Holt, Schneier, Spitzer, & Liebowitz, 1993; Hofmann, Heinrichs, & 
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Moscovitch, 2004; Moscovitch, 2009) and variable responses among patients with SAD to 
standard CBT protocols (e.g., Davidson et al., 2004; Moscovitch, Gavric, et al., 2012), 
information about therapeutic processes that distinguish IR as an intervention may have 
implications for treatment selection based on client characteristics. Future research would be 
helpful in ascertaining for whom, under which conditions, and at what point in therapy IR would 
be most efficacious. 
This study has raised the topic of whether there is any meaningful distinction between a 
single brief and powerful intervention and a stand-alone treatment (see Hollon, 2002). In the 
present study, the brevity of intervention was due to contextual constraints (time, 
researchers/clinicians, space, finances). Indeed, the primary purpose of the study was to examine 
the unique processes and effects of a single therapeutic technique. Nonetheless, the strong impact 
of the intervention lead us to questions about the required length of treatment and optimal 
application of IR in therapy. Based on this study’s results, why would we not simply use the 
three-session model implemented here to treat clients who present with SAD, rather than a 
longer and more costly course of treatment? There are at least a few possible reasons. First, while 
effect sizes were large in this study (as they have been in previous ones investigating IR for 
SAD; see Lee & Kwon, 2013), symptoms were not in the non-clinical range in either study by 
the end of treatment. Thus, while large effects are encouraging, the translation to real-life 
functioning may be less impressive and would indicate that further treatment would likely be of 
added benefit in order to achieve clinically significant impact. Second, we lack research that 
compares stand-alone IR to IR in the context of a standard package or course of CBT; while IR 
does well on its own, additive effects would likely be observed if IR were integrated into a 
standard course of CBT. Third, at present, there is no clear indication of when during treatment, 
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or with which types of clients, IR should be administered, either in addition to or in place of a 
standard course of CBT. Fourth, there is the question of determining therapist competency with 
and adherence to a demanding, semi-structured, and somewhat unusual treatment modality. The 
experiential nature of the technique and the potential for strong affect arousal would make it less 
generic than some CBT techniques, and it might require particular expertise. Fifth, just as IR 
might not be every therapist’s “cup of tea,” some clients may, similarly, find it to be an overly  
demanding or awkward intervention in which to engage. As a stand-alone treatment, the brevity 
of its administration demands rapid rapport building and the skilled scaffolding of relevant 
information, and, to a large extent, leaves the integration of the therapeutic content into the 
client’s life up to the client alone. Ultimately, these questions require more evidence to support 
decision-making on the part of clinicians who would like to incorporate IR into their practice. 
In conclusion, imagery rescripting is an exciting addition to the cognitive behavioural 
toolbox for treating social anxiety. It appears to be particularly effective for altering self-relevant 
negative meaning which, in turn, reduces social anxiety symptoms. Sufficient evidence has 
accumulated to indicate that socially anxious clients are likely to benefit significantly from a 
single session of IR. In addition to the clinical research directions outlined above, future work on 
IR should include the effective dissemination of this powerful tool to clinicians who are actively 
engaged in front-line service delivery of evidence-based psychological treatments. 
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Footnotes 
1
Moscovitch and colleagues (2011) found comparable endorsement rates among low 
socially anxious (LSA) participants who were administered the same interview, indicating that 
negative, recurrent imagery accompanies anxiety in social or performance situations not only for 
those with high trait levels of social anxiety (HSA). While endorsement rates were equivalent 
when compared with LSA participants, HSA participants reported increased negative affect when 
recalling the image to mind, and rated the influence of the negative image as being significantly 
greater on their views of self, others, and the world. Further, because HSA participants, by 
definition, experience the anxiety which the imagery accompanies significantly more often than 
LSA participants, it seems likely that frequency of imagery intrusion might also be a predictor of 
differential impact of imagery on HSA and LSA individuals. However, frequency was not 
measured in Moscovitch and colleagues’ 2011 study. 
2
The procedure used to gather this information is described in detail in the Methods 
section. 
3I use the term ‘subject’ here to denote either the client or the research participant. 
4
However, even here, the research/clinical context remains and it is possible that general 
factors of this context, such as the promise of treatment as well as the clinical (but not 
intentionally therapeutic) tasks such as diagnostic interviewing in advance of the intervention 
itself, which may have had a positive impact on participant outcomes. The study design, in which 
participants were randomized to either WL or IR, did allow us to control for nonspecific treatment 
factors, such as contact with a clinician, etc., while examining the impact of specific treatment 
factors, such as the activities utilized in IR. See Timeline for details. 
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5
While strength of belief in new/revised core beliefs was rated by the participants, 
directly comparing the rated strength of original core beliefs with the rated strength of their new 
core beliefs is not a conceptually sound approach because it does not capture qualitative 
differences that would be inherent in the content of the old versus revised beliefs.  Because we 
expected these qualitative differences to be more meaningful than the quantitative ratings,  a 
simple count is reported (i.e., how many participants changed their beliefs). 
6
For the primary analyses, I chose to follow-up the omnibus between-groups RM 
ANOVA with comparisons of change scores between the two conditions in order to help minimize 
the impact of random variance in absolute scores at each time point across conditions that was 
likely amplified by our modest sample size. However, I also conducted some additional analyses 
to examine changes in SPIN scores over time across the two groups by unpacking the omnibus 
RM ANOVA in different ways without the use of change scores. A RM ANOVA comparing the 
two groups at each of the matched time points – i.e., initial assessment (“T1”), the second live 
session consisting of the WIMI & ACS (“T2”), post-IR in the treatment condition/WL1 in the 
control condition (“T3”), and FU1 in the treatment condition/WL2 in the control condition (“T4”) 
- revealed a significant main effect of Time, F(3, 66) = 6.39, p = .001, 2p = .23 and a significant 
Time x Condition interaction, F(3, 66) = 7.52, p < .001, 2p = .26. Follow up t-tests comparing 
means in the two conditions at these time points showed no significant differences at T1 [t(25) = 
.047, p = .963, Cohen’s d = .02], T2 [t(25) = 1.42, p = .169, Cohen’s d = .57], or T3 [t(24) = .91, p 
= .371, Cohen’s d = .37]. This analysis did yield a statistically significant difference at T4 between 
the IR condition, M = 31.23 (SD = 9.85), and the WL condition, M = 40.00 (SD = 11.39), t(23) = 
2.06, p = .05, Cohen’s d = .86. These analyses highlight the unexpected divergence between the 
two conditions at T2, in which participants who were randomly assigned to the IR condition 
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reported significantly greater social anxiety symptoms relative to those in the WL condition a 
week prior to the start of the intervention despite no differences in symptoms between conditions 
at T1. This pattern is illustrated graphically in Figure 5. It is likely that these differences between 
conditions were caused by random variance and that the impact of such variance would have been 
trivial within the context of a larger sample. However, in this set of analyses, the random 
differences between conditions at T2 consequently obscure the therapeutic effects of IR relative to 
WL at T3. Thus, the change score analyses are useful in helping to minimize the impact of these 
random differences between conditions at T2 and highlight the true impact of the intervention 
across the two conditions at T3. To support the change score analyses, I also ran two within-
groups RM ANOVAs to identify where in the course of the study changes on the SPIN occurred in 
the two groups, separately. For the participants assigned to the IR condition, the omnibus RM 
ANOVA examining changes in SPIN score over time was significant, F(3, 33) = 8.09, p < .001, 
2p = .42. Follow-up t-tests showed that SPIN scores decreased significantly from pre-IR to post-
IR, M = -8.77 (SD = 7.38), t(12) = 4.28, p = .001, and continued to differ significantly from pre-IR 
at both followup sessions, M = -10.54 (SD = 8.49), t(12) = 4.48, p = .001; and M = -13.39 (SD = 
11.68), t(12) = 4.13, p = .001, for FU1 and FU2, respectively. There was no significant rebound 
between intervention and FU1 (p = .927) or FU2 (p = .490), and there was no significant 
difference between FU1 and FU2 (p = .325). For participants in the WL control condition, analysis 
of change in SPIN scores over the course of the study was significant, omnibus F (2.393, 19.145) 
= 4.03, p = .029, 2p = .34 (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected), and follow-up t-tests showed that 
SPIN scores did not differ significantly between assessment at T2 and WL1 (p = .429) or WL2 (p 
= .177). The pattern of change and maintenance matched that of the IR condition, with significant 
decrease to SPIN scores T2 to post-IR, M = -6.62 (SD = 10.78), t(12) = 2.21, p = .047, which 
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continued to differ significantly from T2 at both followup sessions, M = -8.10 (SD = 10.73), t(9) = 
2.39, p = .041; and M = -7.92 (SD = 12.26), t(11) = 2.24, p = .047, for FU1 and FU2, respectively. 
No signficant rebound occurred between intervention and FU1 (p = .631) or FU2 (p = .383), or 
between FU1 and FU2 (p = .571). 
7
Correlating change scores with one another has been a contentious subject (e.g., 
Cronbach & Furby, 1970; but also see Williams & Zimmerman, 1996), in part due to concerns 
about their reliability. In these exploratory analyses, I correlated change scores derived from a 
reliable, multi-item measure (the SPIN) with change scores from single-item measures. It is 
possible that change score variables that did not correlate with SPIN change scores simply lacked 
adequate reliability. To explore this possibility, I first estimated the reliability of SPIN change 
scores using Cronbach’s alpha reported in the original published article on the measure and the 
correlation between SPIN scores at the two time-points used to calculate the change score, using  
          (where rxx and ryy are Cronbach’s alpha .94 and rxy  is the correlation between 
SPIN scores at T1 and T6, the time points used to calculate change scores). Results revealed a 
reliability value of .89 for the SPIN change scores, which is satisfactory. Because it is not 
possible to measure the reliability of the change-scores from single-item variables with this same 
method, a different approach was used to estimate the reliability of the remainder of the change 
score variables. Specifically, I computed correlations among the full set of single-item change 
scores (27 change-score variables in total) to observe whether any of these individual items 
would correlate significantly with any of the other items. I was not interested in which of the 
items would be correlated per se; rather, if any of these change score variables would correlate 
with any of the others with at least moderate strength, it might be possible to deduce that poor 
reliability was likely not the reason that these variables did not also correlate with the SPIN 
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change scores. Conversely, if certain items did not correlate at least moderately with any other, 
we might deduce that an inherent quality of this item – i.e., poor reliability - was interfering with 
the analysis. Results revealed that all single item change scores had medium (r ≥ .20) to large (r 
≥ .30) (Hemphill, 2003) correlations with several (range: 6-16) of the other items, thus indirectly 
supporting their reliability. Hence, although the findings of the exploratory inquiry into 
correlates of change in SAD symptoms remain tentative because of the nature of the data, it is 
not possible to conclude based on these additional reliability analyses that some change score 
variables did not correlate with SPIN change scores because they lacked adequate reliability. 
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Figure 1. Present-focused cognitive model illustrating maintenance of social anxiety.  
In this model, imagery is cued by the situation. The content of the imagery prompts anxiety-
related “thoughts,” which constitute a broadly-defined category of mental experiences which may 
occur either within or outside of awareness. It is thoughts, including appraisals, expectations, 
assumptions, etc., that prompt feelings. Likewise, thoughts prompt behaviours. Behaviours may 
directly cause feelings, or this relationship may be mediated by further thoughts. Self-focused 
attention amplifies this maladaptive pattern, and helps to perpetuate it. Over time, thoughts may 
change the contents of imagery. In this figure, some arrows are dotted to indicate that the 
relationship in those directions is proposed to occur secondarily to the initial, causal influence in 
the reverse direction.   
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Figure 2. Transdiagnostic cognitive model of anxiety illustrating negative imagery as the 
present-focused manifestation of meaning based on autobiographical memories of past (early) 
experiences. 
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Figure 3. Social anxiety ratings on the SPIN over time in the group randomized to receive the 
Imagery Rescripting intervention immediately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Social anxiety ratings on the SPIN over time in the group randomized to the waitlist 
condition prior to receiving the Imagery Rescripting intervention.  
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Figure 5. Social anxiety ratings on the SPIN in both groups at matched time points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Strength of belief in core beliefs, original and updated (i.e., revised following IR), 
about the self, others, and the world. CB = Core beliefs; S = Self’ O = Other; W = World.
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
Assessment Pre-IR WL1/Post-IR WL2/FU1
Control
Treatment
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Pre-IR Post-IR FU1 FU2
CBS -Original
CBS - Updated
CBO - Original
CBO - Updated
CBW - Original
CBW - Updated
0 
0 
 87 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics. 
 Overall Sample Waitlist Control Condition Imagery Rescripting Condition Statistical Test p  
Age in years (SD) 19.52 (1.25) 19.46 19.57 t-test .825   
Gender (% female) 70% 62% 79% t-test .420  
       
Ethnicity    chi-square .475  
   White/European 42% 54% 31%    
   Chinese 30% 23% 39%    
   Other Asian 18% 16% 23%    
   Middle Eastern 4% 8% 0%    
   Black/Carribean 4% 0% 8%    
       
Symptom measure scores at initial assessment      
   SPIN 38.78 (8.92) 37.39 (7.74) 42.07 (9.35) t-test .169  
   LSAS-SR 75.89 (17.67) 70.39 (20.60) 78.64 (19.90) t-test .300  
   DASS_D  8.18 (5.02) 6.39 (4.33) 7.60 (5.15) t-test .545  
       
Comorbid Diagnoses       
   None 60% 62% 57% chi-square .306  
   MDD 11% 8% 14%    
   Dysthymia 7% 15% 0%    
   GAD 7% 0% 7%    
   PTSD  4% 4% 0%    
   Bulimia 4% 0% 4%    
   Specific phobia 4% 0% 4%    
   Multiple comorbidities 11% 0% 11%    
Note: SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale- Self Report; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales, Depression Subscale.  
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for control and treatment groups on symptom measures pre-IR, post-IR, at WL1, WL2, 1-
week followup, and at 1-month followup. 
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Scale Control Group 
 
Pre-Tx 
M         SD 
WL1 
M         SD 
WL2 
M         SD 
Post-Tx 
M         SD 
FU1 
M         SD 
FU2 
M         SD 
SPIN 37.38 7.68 35.92 11.71 40.00 11.39 30.77 14.49 28.00 11.25 29.83 14.10 
LSAS 70.39 20.60 67.62 27.99 67.83 28.38 59.23 24.61 53.60 14.97 57.39 25.52 
DASS_D 6.39 4.33 8.00 4.04 7.58 6.37 6.77 4.23 5.00 4.08 4.92 4.50 
 Experimental Group 
  
SPIN 42.07 9.35     31.92 10.66 31.23 9.85 28.39 12.99 
LSAS 78.64 19.90     68.85 18.85 50.39 17.60 53.31 18.47 
DASS_D 7.60 5.15     6.00 5.98 5.77 5.64 6.46 6.15 
Note: Tx = Treatment; WL = Waitlist; FU = Followup; SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory; LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale- 
Self Report; DASS_D = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, Depression Subscale.  
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Table 3. Participants’ reported associated cognitions: Automatic thoughts (ATs) and core beliefs about self, others, and world. 
 
P 
# 
 
Type Original Associated Cognition Updated Associated Cognition 
10 
AT You're going to mess things. You're going to mess this up, but life goes on. 
Self I am deficient. I am different but that’s okay. 
Others People are unforgiving. People worry too much about fitting in. 
World It's me versus the world. It's me and the world. 
11 
AT 
I look disgusting... why am I even eating around 
other people? 
Food is exciting - it's natural and enjoy it. 
Self I have no self-control. I have control over eating and things in general. 
Others People are judgmental and cruel. 
People care about me and when they express concern it must 
mean that they really love me. 
World 
The world is superficial and you're seen as disgusting 
if you have no self-control. 
People may seem like they're judging you but a lot of the time 
they're just trying to help; people care about each other and 
that's why they're paying attention to what you're doing. 
14 
AT Am I speaking loud enough? Am I talking too fast? Talk slowly and don't worry about other people in the room. 
Self I am not as good as others. 
I am going through the same situation as others - I'm not so 
different from other people. 
Others None. None. 
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World None. None. 
16 
AT You're so stupid. You can never do anything. 
If you take an optimistic attitude, you can achieve more than 
you believe . You're not as stupid as you think. 
Self I am weak. I am weak but I can be stronger if I'm more determined. 
Others People are judgmental & look down on me. People look down on me because I also look down on myself. 
World The world is not fair. 
The world's not fair, but I can work harder to determine my own 
fate. 
20 
AT I can't believe this happened. You can do it. 
Self I'm dumb. Being inexperienced doesn't mean that I am dumb. 
Others 
Given the chance to take the upper hand people will 
take advantage of others. 
Same. 
World The world is a dangerous place. 
Within this dangerous place there are still lots of opportunities 
and choices. It's up to you to you to pick the ones that are right 
for you. 
22 
AT 
What if I stutter? What if I can't answer their 
questions? What if I can't articulate my thoughts?  I 
know I'm going to blush but it's ok. 
I wonder what's going on with other people that's causing their 
response? 
Self I am weak. 
I am satisfied and happy with what I have, and I am accepting of 
my weak points. 
Others People are mean. Some people are insecure and need guidance. 
World 
The world is a competitive place.  Everyone's just 
trying to kill each other so they can thrive. 
The world is a confusing place.  Your opinion on certain aspects 
of life really depends on who you surround yourself with. 
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23 
AT I'm not as good as others. We all have different strengths and weaknesses. 
Self I'm unacceptable. I'm missing something. Nobody's perfect - weaknesses are okay to have. 
Others People are judgmental. Other people's experiences are different from mine. 
World 
The world is a place of high standards and high 
expectations. 
The world is a place of reasonably high standards. 
24 
AT You can't do it. You can do it. 
Self I'm a coward and I'm weak. I do have it in me - sometimes I just need a push to get it out. 
Others 
Other people can handle this. People don't 'get' 
(understand) me. 
I can handle this just as well as others. People get me more than 
I think. 
World None. 
There's good and bad out there - you choose the path you take. 
There will be other chances if this doesn't work out. 
25 
AT 
I'm going to make an idiot of myself. People are 
going to think I'm stupid. Why am I so nervous? Why 
does this matter? 
I can have an opinion. Even if people disagree with it, I still 
have the right it say it. Even if it is wrong. 
Self I'm nothing if I fail at school. Same. 
Others 
People are more successful or better than me. People 
will put me down to feel better about themselves; 
people are catty and awful. 
People are more accepting of me than I often assume. People are 
all unique. I cannot judge people based on previous experiences. 
World 
The world is a judgmental place where your value is 
determined by how others think of you. 
The world can be judgmental but it's also accepting 
26 AT 
I'm boring this person. They don't want to be here. It's 
my responsibility to end this conversation. 
I might think I'm boring this person but I don't know their point 
of view. It's my own assumption that they don't want to be here. 
It's not my responsibility to end this conversation - they would 
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leave if they wanted to. 
Self I am boring. Same. 
Others 
If I trust other people, they will betray me or abandon 
me. 
I can trust the people who I really care about and who care about 
me. 
World 
The world is a very bleak place and everyone is out 
for themselves. 
The world is a very bleak place but there are a few people you 
can rely on and trust - and that's all you need to get by. 
31 
AT 
They're going to think I'm boring or not smart 
enough. 
It doesn't really matter what they think of me. What matters is 
what I think of myself. 
Self If I'm not perfect, I'm nothing. 
As long as I do the best that I can, the outcome doesn't matter, 
and I'll be content with it. 
Others 
Other people are critical and judgmental and they 
expect me to be capable more or be better than the 
average person. 
People have their own problems that they are facing. They're not 
especially critical and judgmental of me and they don't expect 
more of me than anybody else. 
World 
To be successful in the world you have to be perfect 
at everything. 
The world is not as bad a place as I perceive it to be. I just have 
to do my best and the world will be accepting of me. 
32 
AT 
Just relax, you'll get over it soon, it'll be over quickly. 
I can go do something fun or interesting after. 
Same. 
Self I am a disappointment. If I fail, I'll be a nobody. 
Even if you fail, there will still be positive things that will 
happen to you - you'll still be a somebody. 
Others None. None. 
World 
The world is a competitive place - if you can't 
compete, there's no place for you. 
The world is a competitive place - but if you keep trying, there 
will be something for you to look towards. 
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33 
AT This is so fail; Not Again! The amount of effort you put in is what you'll get out of it. 
Self I'm a disappointment I'm not as bad as I think I am. 
Others None. People are pretty cool. 
World None. None. 
34 
AT You are definitely going to screw up You might screw up- and if you do it will not really matter. 
Self I have a huge weakness in my character. I have a weakness in my character. 
Others 
People are cruel and will judge negatively when they 
can. 
People might judge negatively when they can. In the long run it 
still doesn’t matter. 
World None. 
The world doesn’t really know you exist, even if you screw up it 
most likely makes no impact at all. 
35 
AT 
Why is this person talking to me? What do they 
want/need from me? Don't look over at them. Pretend 
they are not there. 
Why is this person behaving this way? Where are they coming 
from? 
Self I'm not likeable. 
I'm not any more uncomfortable than anyone else. I am unique- 
I have positive and negative qualities. If people are critical of 
me it may be more about themselves than my own flaws. 
Others People intentionally look for my flaws. 
People are not necessarily out to get you, they're just looking 
after themselves first. 
World 
It's 'survival of the fittest'. Everyone is out for 
themselves at the expense of other people. 
It is survival of the fittest- If people are put into a situation in 
which they are uncomfortable they will look out for themselves 
first. They won't be as concerned about making others feel 
comfortable as they are ensuring that they themselves feel 
comfortable. 
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37 
AT 
Silly person- stop thinking about this. It's not going to 
help. 
Silly person- we can think about something else now. We'll deal 
with this when it comes up. 
Self I must not fail. I should be perfect. 
Failure happens, but so long as I have the best intentions the 
outcome will be acceptable and not the end of the world. 
Others 
People are critical and judgmental. They wait and 
watch for a slip-up and are satisfied when it happens. 
Other people may notice mistakes, but their opinions of me 
won't be influenced by it. 
World None. 
The world doesn't care if you're perfect, it'll keep going despite a 
slip-up. 
40 
 
 
 
 
AT You don't belong. 
Nobody really is where they belong; everyone just has to make 
do with the people they have around them. 
Self 
I am different, I'm disconnected from others and don't 
have the right to join the group. 
I am different, but so is everybody else. Everybody feels 
disconnected – it’s up to the individual to connect with 
everybody else. 
Others 
Other people are very connected with each other; 
there's no need for me to be connected. 
Other people may be more connected, but everyone has to work 
on it just the same. 
World 
It doesn't make a difference in the world no matter 
who I am or what I do. 
It may not make a difference to the world, who you are or what 
you do; but it makes a difference to you and the people around 
you. 
41 
AT You’re not smart enough, you can’t do this. 
Feeling that anything is open ended, anything can happen, not 
just expecting bad things. 
Self I’m a failure and disappointment to my parents. 
What is more important rather, is not disappointing myself. It’s 
my life not my parents life. I’m not a disappointment to myself, 
I’m still on my journey to finding myself. 
Others Other people are judgmental and not very nice, they While not everyone may be a nice person, you can choose who 
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put down others to feel better about themselves. you surround yourself with, and who you listen to/believe and 
how you react to the people that are not nice - you can just 
remind yourself it doesn’t matter what they think. 
World 
You can have good expectations and intentions, but 
you can’t trust that other people have good intentions 
too, even if they give off the impression that they do, 
and thus the world can be very deceiving. 
It’s most important that you trust yourself – it’s okay if other 
people let you down as long as you don’t let yourself down. 
45 
AT What if it is a really stupid question? Is the question relevant to what I am trying to get out of it? 
Self Other people see me as a failure. 
Be yourself - Don't be scared of criticism or judgment -If you 
are going to make a mistake, that is okay, learn from it, it's 
better than not taking a chance. Realize others could be wrong 
with their judgment, so do not give up. 
Others People are judgmental. 
Other people are not judgmental. People only see that side of 
you that you show them. 
World 
The world is a place where if you aren't good enough 
for the standards, you'll be marginalized. 
Don't give up. You will gain nothing if you risk nothing. You 
should not stop until you get what you wanted. Don't be scared 
of others' perception of you, if they do not like you, it is not the 
end of it. 
47 
AT No one else did a bad job, but I will. I'm incompetent. 
Other people aren't perfect. They'll make mistakes and I will 
too- so I shouldn't judge myself for it but just move on. 
Self 
I’m worthless. If people get to know me, they'll reject 
me. 
If I accept myself, other people will accept me. I've got lots of 
qualities and traits that make me likeable and I can laugh at my 
shortcomings or work on them if I want to change. 
Others 
Other people are confident and know what they’re 
doing. 
Other people don't judge me as much as I might judge myself. 
Everyone has their shortcomings- some just hide it better than 
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others. I don't judge people for their shortcomings so I can 
expect others don't judge me either 
World 
The world is a great place, but if I' m not competent I 
can't be a part of it. 
You don't have to go through the one “ideal" path to have a 
place in the world. The world is a great place in general! 
 
AT 
I can't speak French/Arabic. Why won't they give me 
a chance? Why won't they help me? 
English is my mother tongue - I'm bound to make mistakes in 
Arabic or French. You have to smile through people laughing. 
Self I am a disappointment. I lack confidence. 
I have trouble with second languages. I'm learning and I'm 
sensitive. 
Others 
People are unforgiving, unhelpful, and may even be 
cruel. People enjoy belittling others. 
Some people are bullies, some people are superheroes or 
teachers. Some people enjoy belittling others, but not 
everybody. 
World The world is harsh - people are sharks. 
It's a sharky world out there, but there are nice people too. To 
swim with the sharks you have to have tough skin. 
48 
AT I'm putting out a bad impression. 
Don't think too much about making a bad impression - it might 
not matter that much to the other person anyway. 
Self I'm unlikeable. I'm a shy person but it's something that can be changed. 
Others 
Others have power over me and they are quick to 
judge. 
Others don't know much about you, but they're likely friendly 
people who aren't out to get you. 
World 
It's a hard world. You have only one chance to get it 
right. 
You have to jump onto opportunities presented to you. The 
world isn't going to end if you fail the first time. 
49 
AT We need to get out of this situation. We can't do this. [None recorded.] 
Self 
I am deficient. People will see this and will not 
accept me. 
I'm not deficient, I'm human like everyone else. 
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Others 
Other people can't relate to my struggles, so they'll be 
judgmental and reject me. 
Other people can relate to my experiences because they 
experience them as well. Because they have similar struggles, 
they'll be understanding rather than judgmental or rejecting. 
World 
The world is harsh and cruel. You constantly have to 
prove yourself or you will have a sad, unfulfilled 
existence. 
The world is full of challenges. You need to do your best and if 
you do overall good things will come. 
52 
AT 
The prof dislikes me already, they’ll laugh, I’m going 
to have a heart attack- get out of here. 
It is good that I am participating. It doesn’t matter what the prof 
may be thinking. The fact that I’m taking initiative to participate 
is what matters. 
Self 
I’m not likeable. I’m dumb and I have flaws that need 
to be fixed. 
I am not dumb. I am a smart person with a lot of potential. I 
have a good reason to be confident and speak up for myself. I 
just need to stay true to myself and not worry or take anyone’s 
criticism to heart. 
Others 
Other people are perfect and superior to me. People 
can't be trusted. They are two faced and self-centered 
people. They are also very confident. 
It is okay if people are not always honest and express it if they 
do not like me. People are not all perfect, they do attain flaws 
just like me. Nobody is superior to you unless you make them 
that way, 
World 
You can’t trust the world- it is self-centered and 
nihilistic. 
You cannot trust the world. Even though the world is self-
centered, people have their reasons and intentions which are 
overlooked for being as so. Their intentions are not always there 
to degrade others. 
54 AT Why did I come here? "Is it okay for me to leave?" 
Take time to think beyond the negative because there are 
probably positive reasons why I came here. I came to be 
engaged and it’s time to find ways to make that happen. This 
doesn't have to be scary because other people are probably in the 
same boat. 
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Self I do not matter. 
I only do not matter if I choose not to matter. I can matter if I 
choose to take part. 
Others 
Other people are connected with each other. They do 
not care to include me. Other people do not know 
how it feels to be alone. 
Other people may be feeling the same as me. It is my role to go 
out there and decide for myself. 
World 
It is hard to find your place in the world. There are 
lots of dead-ends. If you do not get it right at first 
then it is difficult to fit in. 
It is hard to find your place in the world. There are dead ends at 
times but if things don’t go right the first time then there are 
always other opportunities to get them going the way you want 
it to. 
55 
AT 
I don't want to do this but I have to. I can always 
leave if it's too uncomfortable but I have to try. 
There are a lot of people and they all have their own objectives. 
Things may turn out well and even if they don't there is a lot of 
distance between me and them so it's okay. 
Self I am invisible. I am invisible, but just like everyone else. 
Others 
Other people are brave and confident - and even the 
possibility that they may reject me is distressing. 
Other people may or may not only be appearing confident. 
World You need to be loud or brave to succeed in the world. You need to appear confident to succeed. 
56 
AT Uh oh, not again, déjà vu. [None recorded.] 
Self I'm a disappointment. 
Even if I feel like a disappointment sometimes, I have the 
potential to do well. 
Others 
People have high expectations of me. If I don't fulfill 
those expectations, then will be disappointed in me 
and reject me. 
Other people's expectations of me are not as high as I might 
expect. Even if they are, people are motivated to help, not just to 
put others down. 
World The future doesn't look any brighter. It's hard to 
survive in the world- it's a competitive place where if 
The world is a competitive place - but to improve yourself and 
not be left behind you have to use trial and error and make 
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you don't improve yourself, you'll be left behind. mistakes and learn from them. The future will be better if you 
try and improve the way. 
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Table 4a. Summary of Repeated Measures ANOVAs of change in compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance towards self and others. 
 
Variable 
Omnibus Pre-Post Pre-FU1 Pre-FU2 Post-FU1 Post-FU2 FU1-FU2 
F (df) p 
2
p t (df) p t (df) p t (df) p t (df) p t (df) p t (df) p 
Compassion for 
Self 
2.47  
(3, 63) 
.070 .105 3.06 
(24) 
.005 1.05 
(22) 
.307 0.14 
(22) 
.890 2.31 
(23) 
.031 2.27 
(23) 
.033 0.81 
(21) 
.427 
Forgiveness of 
Self 
10.59  
(3, 60) 
.000 .346 5.45 
(23) 
.000 2.31 
(22) 
.031 1.45 
(22) 
.162 3.46 
(21) 
.002 3.43 
(22) 
.002 0.72 
(21) 
.480 
Acceptance of 
Self 
16.73  
(3, 63) 
.000 .443 7.34 
(24) 
.000 3.66 
(22) 
.001 3.76 
(22) 
.001 3.32 
(22) 
.003 2.94 
(23) 
.007 0.21 
(21) 
.833 
                
Compassion for 
Others 
7.63  
(3, 63) 
.000 .267 4.10 
(24) 
.000 4.53 
(22) 
.000 2.71 
(22) 
.013 0.59 
(22) 
.560 1.44 
(23) 
.164 1.23 
(21) 
.234 
Forgiveness of 
Others 
7.14  
(3, 60) 
.000 .263 4.24 
(23) 
.000 2.42 
(22) 
.024 2.47 
(22) 
.022 2.57 
(21) 
.018 2.12 
(22) 
.045 0.24 
(21) 
.815 
Acceptance of 
Others 
6.73  
(3, 63) 
.001 .243 3.87 
(24) 
.001 2.47 
(22) 
.022 1.10 
(22) 
.283 2.11 
(22) 
.047 2.79 
(23) 
.010 1.89 
(21) 
.073 
                
 
Note. Pre = Pre-treatment; Post = post-treatment; FU = followup 
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Table 4b. Between-groups comparisons (IR vs. WL) of compassion, forgiveness, and acceptance towards self and others at matched 
time points after either the intervention or waitlist. 
 
Variable 
t-test  
t  df p  
Compassion for 
Self 
3.56  
 
24 .002  
Forgiveness of 
Self 
3.69 
 
23 .001  
Acceptance of 
Self 
6.98  
 
24 <.001  
     
Compassion for 
Others 
2.68  
 
24 .013  
Forgiveness of 
Others 
1.67  
 
23 .108  
Acceptance of 
Others 
2.06  
 
24 .050  
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Table 5. Correlations of change between process variables measured from pre-IR to post-IR and SPIN 
scores measured from intake to one-week followup. 
 Pearson’s 
r 
p n 
Spearman’s 
Rho 
p n 
   SPIN                                                     SPIN 
CB Self .515 .012 23    
CB Other    .200 .384 21 
CB World -.019 .942 17    
       
Self:       
Compassion -.497 .019 22    
Forgiveness -.464 .030 22    
Acceptance 
 
-.362 .098 22    
Others:       
Compassion -.071 .755 22    
Forgiveness .137 .542 22    
Acceptance 
 
-.183 .414 22    
Image Qualities:       
Real    .113 .607 23 
Change    -.016 .942 23 
RepNeg -.061 .783 23    
InflViewSelf .270 .214 23    
MoodWorse .157 .473 23    
CanControl 
 
-.118 .593 23    
Memory Qualities:       
Sense of Powerlessness    -.068 .757 23 
Sense of Empowerment -.179 .415 23 .316 .142 23 
Identify w Self in Mem     -.373 .080 23 
Don’t identify w Self in .082 .710 23    
Negative feelings -.271 .210 23      
Intense feelings .179 .415 23      
Anxiety 
 
-.239 .285 22      
Defusion from:       
Scale total -.247 .267 22    
SAD group social -.372 .088 22    
SAD 1-1 social    .451 .035 22 
CB Self -.322 .144 22    
CB Other -.214 .411 17    
CB World -.214 .411 17    
Note:  Spearman’s rho is reported whenever change variables were not normally distributed (p<.05 on 
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality)
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Appendix A: Visual timeline 
Participants excluded following Assessment: 
 
 
 
 
OR 
 
 
Intervention Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OR 
 
Control (Waitlist-then-Intervention) Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WL2: 
Online Qs 
Assessment:  
Interview & Qs 
Pre-IR:  
WIMI & ACS  
Qs 
 
Imagery 
Rescripting 
   & Post-IR Qs 
 
Followup 1:  
       Online Qs 
 
1 week 1 week 
 
1 week 
Compensation Compensation Compensation 
Compensation 
No further participation 
Session 2:  
Interview & Qs 
90 mins 
Followup 2:  
Online Qs 
 
WL1: 
Online Qs 
20 mins 
1 week 
 
1 week 
 
1 week 
 
1 week 
 Compensation 
Compensation 
Compensation 
Followup 1:  
 Online Qs 
 
Assessment:  
Interview & Qs 
Assessment:  
Interview & Qs 
Pre-IR
WIMI & ACS  
Qs 
 
Imagery 
Rescripting 
   & Post-IR Qs 
 
Followup 2:  
Online Qs 
 
1 week 
1 month 
1 month 
 105 
 
 
Appendix B. Measures administered at each time point. 
 
Assessment Pre-IR WL1* WL2* IR & Post-IR FU1 FU2 
M.I.N.I. W.I.M.I. 
& A.C.S. 
  Imagery 
Rescripting 
 
  
 Image, 
Memory, 
Cognition 
(IMC) 
Summary Sheet 
  Revised I.M.C. 
Summary Sheet 
  
SPIN SPIN SPIN SPIN SPIN SPIN SPIN 
LSAS LSAS LSAS LSAS LSAS LSAS LSAS 
DASS_D DASS_D DASS_D DASS_D DASS_D DASS_D DASS_D 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD 
items 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD & 
CB 
items 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD & 
CB 
items 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD & 
CB 
items 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD & 
CB 
items 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD & 
CB 
items 
DDS  
 Total 
 SAD & 
CB 
items 
 Image Items Image Items Image Items  Image Items Image Items 
 Memory Items Memory Items Memory Items Memory Items Memory Items Memory Items 
 Associated 
cognition items 
Associated 
cognition items 
Associated 
cognition items 
Associated 
cognition items 
Associated 
cognition items 
Associated 
cognition items 
*Waitlist condition participants only
 106 
 
    
Appendix C. Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) 
 
 SPIN 
 
Please choose a number to indicate how much the following problems have bothered you during the past 
week. Choose only one number for each problem, and be sure to answer all items. 
 
0 = Not at all 
1 = A little bit 
2 = Somewhat 
3 = Very much 
4 = Extremely 
 
1.  I am afraid of people in authority.  0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I am bothered by blushing in front of people.    0 1 2 3 4 
3.  Parties and social events scare me.    0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I avoid talking to people I don’t know.    0 1 2 3 4 
5.  Being criticized scares me a lot.    0 1 2 3 4 
6.  Fear of embarrassment causes me to avoid doing things or speaking 
  to people.    0 1 2 3 4 
7.  Seating in front of people causes me distress.    0 1 2 3 4 
8.  I avoid going to parties.    0 1 2 3 4 
9.  I avoid activities in which I am the centre of attention.   0 1 2 3 4 
10.  Talking to strangers scares me.    0 1 2 3 4 
11. I avoid having to give speeches.    0 1 2 3 4 
12. I would do anything to avoid being criticized.    0 1 2 3 4 
13. Heart palpitations bother me when I am around people.   0 1 2 3 4 
14. I am afraid of doing things when people might be watching.   0 1 2 3 4 
15. Being embarrassed or looking stupid are among my worst fears.  0 1 2 3 4 
16. I avoid speaking to anyone in authority.    0 1 2 3 4 
17.  Trembling or shaking in front of others is distressing to me.   0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix D: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale – Self Report (LSAS-SR; Cox, Ross, Swinson, & Direnfeld, 
1998) 
 
LSAS-SR 
 
This measure assesses the way that social phobia plays a role in your life across a variety of situations.  
Read each situation carefully and answer two questions about that situation.  The first question asks how 
anxious or fearful you feel in the situation.  The second question asks how often you avoid the situation.  
If you come across a situation that you ordinarily do not experience, we ask that you imagine "what if 
you were faced with that situation," and then, rate the degree to which you would fear this hypothetical 
situation and how often you would tend to avoid it.  Please base your ratings on the way that the 
situations have affected you in the last week.  Fill out the following scale with the most suitable answer 
provided below. 
 
FEAR OR ANXIETY AVOIDANCE 
0 = None 0 = Never (0%) 
1 = Mild 1 = Occasionally (1-33%) 
2 = Moderate 2 = Often (34-67%) 
3 = Severe 3 = Usually (68-100%) 
 
 FEAR OR 
ANXIETY 
AVOIDANCE 
1.  Telephoning in public    
2.  Participating in small groups    
3.  Eating in public places    
4.  Drinking with others in public places    
5.  Talking to people in authority    
6.  Acting, performing or giving a talk in front of an audience    
7.  Going to a party    
8.  Working while being observed    
9.  Writing while being observed    
10. Calling someone you don’t know very well    
11. Talking with people you don’t know very well   
12. Meeting strangers    
13. Urinating in a public bathroom    
14. Entering a room when others are already seated    
15. Being the center of attention    
16. Speaking up at a meeting    
17. Taking a test    
18. Expressing a disagreement or disapproval to people you   
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don’t know very well 
19. Looking at people you don’t know very well in the eyes    
20. Giving a report to a group     
21. Trying to pick up someone    
22. Returning goods to a store    
23. Giving a party    
24. Resisting a high pressure salesperson    
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Appendix D: Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 21-item (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). 
 
DASS-21 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement 
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
any statement. 
 
     0 = Did not apply to me at all 
     1 = Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
     2 = Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
     3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
 
1.  I found it hard to wind down  0 1 2 3 
2.   I was aware of dryness of my mouth   0 1 2 3 
3.  I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all*  0 1 2 3 
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing,  
          breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 0 1 2 3 
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things  0 1 2 3 
6. I tended to over-react to situations   0 1 2 3 
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)   0 1 2 3 
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy   0 1 2 3 
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and  
 make a fool of myself  0 1 2 3 
10.  I felt that I had nothing to look forward to   0 1 2 3 
11.   I found myself getting agitated   0 1 2 3 
12.  I found it difficult to relax   0 1 2 3 
13. I felt down-hearted and blue   0 1 2 3 
14.  I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what  
 I was doing  0 1 2 3 
15.  I felt I was close to panic   0 1 2 3 
16.  I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything  0 1 2 3 
17.  I felt I wasn't worth much as a person   0 1 2 3 
18.  I felt that I was rather touchy   0 1 2 3 
19.  I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion  
         (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 0 1 2 3 
20.  I felt scared without any good reason  0 1 2 3 
21.  I felt that life was meaningless   0   1 2 3 
 
*Bolded items consitute depression subscale. 
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Appendix F: Image items. 
IMAGE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please answer these questions in reference to the following image:  
 
 
 
 
  
   INSTRUCTIONS:  Please answer the following questions about the image that you just          
   recollected according to the scale below:  
 
1---------- -------- 2 -------- -- -------- 3 -------- ------------- 4 -------- ----------- 5 
Very Slightly or  A Little     Moderately  Very Much    Extremely 
Not At All          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
V
ery S
lig
h
tly 
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M
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E
xtrem
ely 
    Image Qualities: Perception      
          The content of the image seemed very real to me.      
  
      While envisioning the mental image, I feel able to mentally change the details of the  
      image. 
     
     Image Feelings/Emotions      
         While recalling the mental image , the emotions I felt were negative.      
         While recalling the mental image , the emotions I felt were intense.      
        While experiencing the mental image, I felt anxious.      
    The Image in My Life      
  
      The mental image represents a part of myself that I am embarrassed, ashamed, or  
      otherwise don’t feel very good about. 
     
        This mental image influences how I view myself.        
        This mental image influences how I view other people.        
        This mental image influences how I view the world in general.        
        In what it means to me about the world in general.        
[Insert individualized content here.] 
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Appendix G: Memory items. 
 
 
MEMORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please answer these questions in reference to your memory of the following event:  
 
 
 
   INSTRUCTIONS:  Please answer the following questions about the event that you just       
recollected according to the scale below:  
 
1---------- -------- 2 -------- -- -------- 3 -------- ------------- 4 -------- ----------- 5 
Very Slightly or  A Little     Moderately  Very Much    Extremely 
Not At All          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
V
ery S
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h
tly 
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E
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ely 
     Memory Feelings/Emotions      
        While remembering the event, the emotions I felt were negative.      
        While remembering the event, the emotions I felt were intense.      
             
        While remembering the event, I felt anxious.      
    The Memory in my Life      
  
      The memory was of an event that I am embarrassed, ashamed, or otherwise don’t feel 
      very good about. 
     
        This event influenced how I view myself.        
        This event influenced how I view other people.        
        This event influenced how I view the world in general.        
    Memory Qualities, Personal        
  
      I ‘identify’ with the person I was at the time of the event (i.e., I feel like I am similar now  
      to the person I was then). 
       
  
      I no longer ‘identify’ with the person I was at the time of the event (i.e., I feel like I am  
      different now form the person I was then). 
       
        The memory of this event is imbued with a sense of powerlessness.        
        When I reflect on the event now, I feel a sense of empowerment.        
[Insert individualized content here.] 
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        I feel compassion towards the other people who were part of the memory.        
        I feel compassion towards myself at the time of the memory.        
        I feel forgiveness towards the other people who were part of the memory.        
        I feel forgiveness towards myself at the time of the memory.        
        I feel acceptance towards the other people who were part of the memory.        
        I feel acceptance towards myself at the time of the memory.        
 113 
 
Appendix H: Associated cognitions items. 
 
 
ASSOCIATED COGNITIONS QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS:  Please answer the following questions about your ‘Associated Cognitions’ currently or 
over the past week. Your own statements are included in each question as a reminder of your Associated 
Cognitions.  
Think about the “automatic thought” from the second session. As a reminder, you summarized it as 
“[participant’s own statement from ACS in Pre-IR session].”    
1. Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you currently believe that “automatic thought”; 
that is, how true or likely it seems to you at this time. 
0--------10--------20--------30--------40--------50--------60--------70--------80--------90--------100 
 
 
Think about the “core belief about self” from the second session. As a reminder, you summarized it as 
“[participant’s own statement from ACS in Pre-IR session].”   
2. Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you currently believe that “core belief about self”; 
that is, how true or likely it seems to you at this time. 
0--------10--------20--------30--------40--------50--------60--------70--------80--------90--------100 
 
 
Think about the “core belief about others” from the second session. As a reminder, you summarized it as 
“[participant’s own statement from ACS in Pre-IR session].”   
2. Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you currently believe that “core belief about 
others”; that is, how true or likely it seems to you at this time. 
0--------10--------20--------30--------40--------50--------60--------70--------80--------90--------100 
 
Think about the “core belief about the world” from the second session. As a reminder, you summarized it 
as “[participant’s own statement from ACS in Pre-IR session].”   
2. Using the scale provided, please rate the extent to which you currently believe that “core belief about the 
world”; that is, how true or likely it seems to you at this time. 
0--------10--------20--------30--------40--------50--------60--------70--------80--------90--------100 
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Appendix I: Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS; Forman, Herbert, Juarascio, Yeomans, Zebell, Goetter, et al., 
2011) + SA & AC items. 
Drexel Defusion Scale (DDS) 
 
Defusion is a term used by psychologists to describe a state of achieving distance from internal experiences such as 
thoughts and feelings.  Suppose you put your hands over your face and someone asks you, “What do hands look like?”  
You might answer, “They are all dark.”  If you held your hands out a few inches away, you might add, “they have fingers 
and lines in them.” In a similar way, getting some distance from your thoughts allows you to see them for what they are.  
The point is to notice the process of thinking as it happens rather than only noticing the results of that process, in other 
words, your thoughts.  When you think a thought, it “colors” your world.  When you see a thought from a distance, you can 
still see how it “colors” your world (you understand what it means), but you also see that you are doing the “coloring.”  It 
would be as if you always wore yellow sunglasses and forgot you were wearing them.  Defusion is like taking off your 
glasses and holding them several inches away from your face; then you can see how they make the world appear to be 
yellow instead of only seeing the yellow world. 
 
Similarly, when you are defused from an emotion you can see yourself having the emotion, rather than simply being in it.  
When you are defused from a craving or a sensation of pain, you don’t just experience the craving or pain, you see yourself 
having them.  Defusion allows you to see thoughts, feelings, cravings, and pain as simply processes taking place in your 
brain.  The more defused you are from thoughts or feelings, the less automatically you act on them. 
 
For example, you may do something embarrassing and have the thought “I’m such an idiot.”  If you are able to defuse from 
this thought, you will be able to see it as just a thought.  In other words you can see that the thought is something in your 
mind that may or may not be true.  If you are not able to defuse, you would take the thought as literally true, and your 
feelings and actions would automatically be impacted by the thought. 
 
Based on the definition of defusion above, please rate each scenario according to the extent to which 
you would normally be in a state of defusion in the specified situation.  You may want to read through 
all the examples before beginning to respond to the questions.  (Important: you are not being asked about 
the degree to which you would think certain thoughts or feel a certain way, but the degree to which you 
would defuse if you did.) 
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1  
Feelings of Anger.  You become angry when someone takes your place in a long line.  To what extent 
would you normally be able to defuse from feelings of anger?  
      
2  
Cravings for Food.  You see your favorite food and have the urge to eat it.  To what extent would you 
normally be able to defuse from cravings for food? 
      
3  
Physical Pain.  Imagine that you bang your knee on a table leg.  To what extent would you normally be 
able to defuse from physical pain? 
      
4  
Anxious Thoughts.  Things have not been going well at school or at your job, and work just keeps 
piling up.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from anxious thoughts like “I’ll never 
get this done.”? 
      
5  
Thoughts of self.  Imagine you are having a thought such as “no one likes me.”  To what extent would 
you normally be able to defuse from negative thoughts about yourself? 
      
6  
Thoughts of Hopelessness.  You are feeling sad and stuck in a difficult situation that has no obvious 
end in sight.  You experience thoughts such as “Things will never get any better.”  To what extent 
would you normally be able to defuse from thoughts of hopelessness? 
      
7  
Thoughts about motivation or ability.  Imagine you are having a thought such as “I can’t do this” or 
“I just can’t get started.”  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from thoughts about 
motivation or ability? 
      
8  
Thoughts about Your Future.  Imagine you are having thoughts like, “I’ll never make it” or “I have 
no future.”  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from thoughts about your future? 
      
9  
Sensations of Fear.  You are about to give a presentation to a large group. As you sit waiting your turn, 
you start to notice your heart racing, butterflies in your stomach, and your hands trembling.  To what 
extent would you normally be able to defuse from sensations of fear? 
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10  
Feelings of Sadness.  Imagine that you lose out on something you really wanted.  You have feelings of 
sadness.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from feelings of sadness? 
      
 
  Social Anxiety Items       
11  
Anxiety About Group Social Situations. You are preparing to go to a party and experience thoughts 
such as "I won't make a good impression" and "I won't be able to start and maintain conversations." To 
what extent would you normally be able to defuse from anxious thoughts about a group social situation? 
      
12  
Anxiety About One-on-One Interpersonal Situations. You find yourself alone with a coworker or 
classmate whom you don't know well. This person says hello, and looks as if he or she want to talk. 
You experience thoughts such as "I won't have anything to say" and symptoms of anxiety such as a 
racing heart and flushing.  To what extent would you normally be able to defuse from such anxious 
thoughts and feelings in one-on-one interpersonal situations? 
      
 
Based on the definition of defusion above, please rate each of your own thoughts/beliefs for how much 
you are in a state of defusion from the thought as you experience it.  That is, how much you achieve 
internal distance from the thought. 
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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1  Automatic Thoughts:   “[participant’s own content]”       
2  Core belief about Self: “[participant’s own content]”       
3  Core belief about Other People: “[participant’s own content]”       
4  Core belief about the World in general: “[participant’s own content]”       
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Appendix J: Waterloo Images and Memories Interview (WIMI; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, 
& Moscovitch, 2011) 
 
Images and Early Memories Interview 
 
 
1. THIS INTERVIEW should be audio taped so that it can be rated by a blind assessor. 
2. Italics are instructions for interviewer and are not read aloud.  
 
 
IMAGE (-) 
To start, I’d like you to think about a social situation that makes you anxious, such as [insert most 
anxiety-provoking situation].  Can you close your eyes for a moment and imagine yourself in that type 
of situation?  Tell me when you’ve got it. Okay, good.  Now try to become aware of whether there is a 
mental image – the type of picture of impression we spoke about earlier – that comes into your mind 
when you enter or anticipate entering [insert most anxiety-provoking situation]? (Give the participant 
some contemplative, quiet time to consider this). 
 
I. IMAGE (-) FREE RECALL:  
 
 
 
 
Do you experience a mental image or picture of some sort when you enter or are anticipating [insert 
social situation]?  
 
YES/NO 
 
(If “yes,” obtain description in FREE RECALL and then skip to GENERAL PROBE. Do not administer CUED 
RECALL). 
Please describe that image to me in as much detail you can. 
 
(If “no,” skip directly to CUED RECALL) 
 
 
 
 
 
TIME    
Start:______:______ 
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II. IMAGE (-) CUED RECALL: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although many people do report experiencing these sorts of images, some people do not. So, if you 
really believe you do not experience these types of images, please do let me know and we’ll move on.  
Those people who do have these types of images often say that they are like pictures or snapshots of 
themselves behaving or appearing a certain way; or images or snapshots of interaction partners or 
audience observers; or even snapshots of landscapes or scenes that seem frozen in time. Do any of 
these sound familiar to you?  Are you aware now of whether you might experience mental images 
when you are in anxiety-provoking social situations?   
 
 
YES/NO 
(If “yes,” obtain description in CUED RECALL and then skip to GENERAL PROBE). 
(If “no,” skip directly to the positive image section) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIME    
Start:______:______ 
 
 
 118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. IMAGE (-) GENERAL PROBE: 
 
Is that everything you can access about the image or is there anything else that comes to mind? Please 
keep in mind that we need as many details as you can possibly envisage in the image.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMAGE (-) SPECIFIC PROBES 
 Do not ask these questions until all general probes have been asked.  
 Remind the participant of the image (provide brief description from their recall & general probe. 
Also, remind the participant that we need as many details as she or she can report from the 
image.) 
[Use the participant’s own words to inquire about various aspects of the image. It is not necessary to 
ask any specific questions, but rather to follow up on key words that they mentioned during the 
previous portions of the interview. Ask open-ended questions]. 
 
 
Now, I would like to go back to the image we have already discussed, and I would like to ask you some 
specific questions about it.  
 
TIME    
Stop:______:______ 
 
 
TIME    # of Questions 
Start:______:______ 
 
Stop:______:______ 
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IMAGE (-) FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS (for participants who endorsed having a negative image): 
 
1. Approximately how old were you when you first began experiencing this image?  ________ 
 
2. Does this image you just described typically come to mind when you’re in these types of anxiety 
provoking social situations such as [insert participant’s most anxiety-provoking situation]? In 
other words, is it a recurring image that always includes the same kinds of things?   
 
YES/NO 
 
3. Other than (insert most anxiety-provoking social situation), what other social situations make 
you nervous? Do you experience different kinds of images in these other types of social 
situations that make you nervous, or are these images always similar to the image you just 
described to me?   
 
SAME/DIFFERENT (if different, jot down a brief description below of themes in different images 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORY (-) 
 
I. MEMORY (-) FREE RECALL:   
Is there a particular event that happened at a specific time and place in your life that you can think of 
that may have led to the formation of the image we just talked about? Or can you recall the first time 
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you felt the way you feel in the image, or experienced something very reminiscent of the image? For 
now, please just answer “yes” or “no.” 
 
YES/NO 
 (If “yes,” obtain description in FREE RECALL and then skip to GENERAL PROBE. Do not administer CUED 
RECALL). 
(If “no,” skip directly to CUED RECALL) 
 
If “YES”, ask how old they were when it occurred. ______    
 
 
 
 
 
Can you tell me about that event now? Please describe the event in as much detail as possible. I will 
just sit here and listen until you finish telling me everything you can remember about that event. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. MEMORY (-) CUED RECALL: 
 
 
 
 
Although many people do report having these sorts of memories, some people do not. So, if you really 
believe you do not have any memory of this nature, please do let me know and we’ll move on.  People 
who do have such memories often report specific memories of negative social experiences that 
happened to them. These negative events are often related to behaving inappropriately, appearing 
awkward, or making mistakes in front of others, and being judged negatively, criticized, or rejected by 
people you wanted to make a good impression on. Do you recall any of these types of experiences 
happening to you that might be related to the mental images that pop into your mind in anxiety-
provoking social situations? 
 
YES/NO 
TIME    
Start:______:______ 
 
Stop:______:______ 
 
 
TIME    
Start:______:______ 
 
Stop:______:______ 
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(If “yes,” obtain description in CUED RECALL and then skip to GENERAL PROBE). 
(If “no,” skip directly to the positive image section) 
 
 
 
 
 
III. MEMORY (-) GENERAL PROBE:  
 
 
 
 
 
Is that everything you can recall about the memory or is there anything else that comes to mind? 
Please keep in mind that we need as many details as you can possibly remember. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORY (-) SPECIFIC PROBES 
 Do not ask these questions until all general probes have been asked.  
 Remind the participant of the memory (provide brief description from their recall & general 
probe. Also remind the participant that we need as many details as he or she can remember) 
[Use the participant’s own words to inquire about various aspects of the memory. It is not necessary to 
ask any specific questions, but rather to follow up on key words that they mentioned during the 
previous portions of the interview. Ask open-ended questions]. 
 
Now, let’s pay attention to the memory you described. I would now like to ask some specific questions 
about ... [briefly describe anxious memory] 
Ask specific probe questions based on key words participants have provided.  
 
 
TIME    
Start:______:______ 
 
Stop:______:______ 
 
 
TIME    # of Questions 
Start:______:______ 
 
Stop:______:______ 
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Appendix K: Associated Cognitions Supplement to the WIMI (ACS) 
Introduce this module to the participant using the following script: 
 
“For some people, memories of events like these contain important and possibly deep meanings. 
The next thing we’ll do together is to look for meaning that may be represented by the recurrent 
image and the memory we’ve identified. I’ll walk you through this process, using a technique that 
is often used in therapy. I will act as a guide, but what we find is up to you. Some people identify 
thoughts and meanings that go along with the memories, but others don’t. Just say what’s true for 
you. First, we’ll try to get a ‘snapshot’ of the thoughts that might go along with the image; then 
we’ll explore possible deeper significance represented by the memory. We’ll look for beliefs that 
might be ‘encapsulated’, or contained, in that event - beliefs about yourself, about other people, 
and about the world in general. If, as we proceed, you feel there is no underlying meaning present, 
we can move on to the next area. As the clinician, I’ll be helping you look for meaning, but if there 
does not seem to be a strong meaning there, I will ask you about that and we can move on.” 
 
Recall the recurrent image described by the participant in part 1 of the WIMI. If they spontaneously 
disclosed an automatic thought (AT) that occurs along with the image, recall that thought and confirm 
that that is the most salient thought attached to the image; adjust if needed. If they did not spontaneously 
report an AT, ask them: 
 
“When you experience this image, is there often a kind of thought that pops into your head along 
with it? In other words, what do you tend to find yourself thinking, or that you tend to think to 
yourself, as you experience this image?” 
 
If they need further prompting, or don’t understand, you may clarify: 
 
“Is there something you are thinking in the memory? What are you thinking to yourself while....?” 
“Is there a kind of central thought you might be having?” 
 
If they do not spontaneously report automatic thoughts occurring along with the memory and/or image, 
you may ask questions like these to elicit cognition: 
 
 “For example, some people might have a thought about themselves, or about other people in the 
situation; a specific concern might come to mind, or even a criticism... Is there a thought like this 
that seems to just come into your mind along with the image?” 
 
If/once a thought is identified and articulated, tell the participant: 
“We will call this the ‘Automatic Thought’ associated with the recurrent image. We’re giving it a 
name because we’ll refer to it later, in your next session, and also in some questionnaires. Let’s 
write it down so you can recall it easily.” 
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Write down the encapsulated belief. If a thought was identified, proceed as follows: 
 
“Okay, so when that image comes into your mind, you think to yourself _____. Let’s look together 
to see if there’s a deeper meaning underneath that thought – let’s see if we can find something 
more about how you see yourself, or other people, or the world in general.” 
 
Then using the participant’s words and the content of the memory, follow up on the verbal-cognitive-
semantic aspect of their reported memory. If the memory contains automatic thoughts that are reported, 
look for meaning beginning with these thoughts, following the thread provided by the participant: 
 
 “And let’s suppose that were true/that would happen/etc, what would it mean to you?” 
 
If the participant says something here to indicate that this would not mean anything important to them, 
end the questioning for this domain. If material is evident, continue: 
 
“And let’s suppose that were true, what would it mean about  you?” 
 
If the participant does not generate a response to these questions, it can be assumed there is no 
associated core belief. Use great sensitivity in prompting to see if meaning is present; do not question in 
such a manner that the participant must generate a meaning. 
 
If /once a core belief is identified, say,  
“Okay, it seems we’ve found a pretty strong belief there. We’ll call this the Core Belief; we’ll call it 
“core” because it’s an underlying belief, something deep. Like with the Automatic Thought, we’re 
giving this a name because we’re going to return to it next session and some of the questionnaires 
will be about this belief. Let’s write it down so we can remember it.” 
 
Make a note of the belief, in the exact wording that you have arrived at with the participant. Review the 
Automatic Thought and the Core Belief, to help them remember which is which. 
 
Here, or in other inquiries, below, if the participant experiences emotional distress, general clinical skill 
must be used. Depending on the individual’s expression of distress, the following clinical skills may be 
deployed: 
 Empathic listening and reflecting (e.g., “I see this is hard for you to talk about.”) 
 Normalizing (e.g., “It is quite normal to have an emotional response [or, to cry, etc.] when 
discussing feelings. That’s okay.”) 
 Providing hope (e.g., “It’s hard to lay this stuff out on the table. Next time, we’ll have a chance 
to actually help with some of these feelings.”) 
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If the participant reports that they do not have such spontaneous thoughts as discussed above, ask 
directly about the content of the memory/image: 
 
“Reflecting on this memory, what does this memory say about you? What does it mean to you 
about yourself?” until arriving at an “absolute statement that seems unchangeable” (Greenberger & 
Padesky, 1995). 
 
 
Check in with the participant about encapsulated meanings in the other domains (cover all three of self, 
others, and the world in general). 
“We’ve looked into meaning about [yourself/other people/the world in general] embedded in this 
memory. Let’s think now if this memory represents to you something important about 
[yourself/other people/the world in general]. What do you think this experience taught you about 
[yourself/other people/the world in general]?” 
And then explore for deeper meaning, using the same prompts: 
“And let’s suppose that were true/that would happen/etc, what would it mean to you?” 
If the participant say something here to indicate that this would not mean anything important to them, 
end the questioning for this domain. If material is evident, continue: 
“And let’s suppose that were true, what would it mean about you/others/the world?” 
As above, if the participant does not generate a response to these questions, it can be assumed there is no 
associated core belief. Use great sensitivity in prompting to see if meaning is present; do not question in 
such a manner that the participant must generate a meaning. 
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Appendix L: Image/Memory/Cognition Summary Sheet (IMC Summary). 
 
Summary of Today’s Session 
 
A. Image:  ______________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
B. Memory: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Automatic Thought(s): 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Core/Encapsulated Beliefs(s): 
2. Self:  __________________________________________________________________   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Others:  ________________________________________________________________   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The World:  _____________________________________________________________   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix M: Imagery Rescripting Protocol. 
 
Imagery Rescripting takes place during a single session, with the autobiographical memory content to be 
“rescripted” being derived from the Session 2 (WIMI + Beliefs) interview. Using the material identified 
in the prior session, the purpose of this brief intervention is to “contextualize and update” early 
memories – that is, revisit and intervene in the pivotal memory, incorporating new, imaginal content and 
outcomes for the event, and deriving new meaning.  Whereas the control intervention condition, 
cognitive restructuring, is designed to explicitly “challenge the meaning of the early event and its 
implications for the present,” imagery rescripting is an experiential intervention from which new 
meaning may be derived, but which does not explicitly work to alter the identified cognition; new 
interpretations may derive implicitly from the re-experiencing and alterations of the memory event.   
 
The participant “revisits” the pivotal memory that was identified in the previous session. The goal of 
rescripting is to “change the nature and thus the meaning of the memory within the imagery process 
itself” (Stopa, 2009). 
 
The form of the intervention is as follows: 
The recurrent image, pivotal memory, and associated AT and CB are reviewed. 
The rationale for the intervention is provided: 
“What we hope to accomplish today is to give you the opportunity to revisit the difficult event you 
described last time we met, and to work within the memory itself to change the meaning the event has for 
you. So what the technique looks like is that, almost like in a meditation, you’ll bring to mind that old 
experience. What we’ll be doing together is a technique that has been practiced as part of cognitive-
behavioural therapy for helping with all kinds of early experiences and troubling symptoms. I’ll walk 
you through all of this as we go, and we’ll explore the details of the event, as well as bringing new 
information into the memory. We don’t need to think ahead; we’ll just get ready to begin, and I will help 
guide you through the experience. Do you have questions before we begin? 
 
“It is often easiest for people to concentrate if I sit to your side, so no-one is across from you. It’s often 
helpful to dim the lights just a little bit. Would you prefer that? Many people find it helpful to close their 
eyes so that they can imagine the scene without distraction from the present; it’s up to you if you’d like 
to do this, and you can open or close your eyes as you wish. If you don’t want to close them, it might 
help to gaze toward the floor. Either way, you and I don’t need to maintain eye contact.  
“So let’s begin by having you recall the memory as though you are immersed in it right now. Bring the 
event to mind, and describe to me in as much detail what you are seeing and hearing, and what it’s like 
– again, as though you are really there.”  
Encourage them to speak in the present-tense, using the first person (i.e., “I see…” rather than “there 
was…” etc.). After, or along with, providing sensory details of the event, if they do not spontaneously 
report what is happening in the memory, go on to prompt them: 
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“And what is happening? How are you feeling? What are you thinking?” Elicit information about who 
is present, what happened sequentially, and so on. Once the event has been fully elaborated and 
‘relived’, go on to the next stage. 
“Now what we will do is have you visit that same scene you just described, but as your current, adult 
self. I want you to observe the scene, but remain on the sidelines, and describe to me what you are 
seeing, and what unfolds in front of you.” Elicit the participant’s thoughts and feelings, as well as the 
episodic details they observe. It can be helpful to draw their attention to salient features, such as the look 
on the face of their earlier self, to access interpretations and underlying emotions. Once they have 
described fully their current experience when ‘observing’ the past event (and if they have not already 
done so spontaneously), you may ask them what they would like to do to intervene in the situation, to 
change what is happening, or the like. It is important that the participant generate their own idiosyncratic 
actions and resolutions. The participant is encouraged to intervene in whatever way(s) they feel 
compelled; they may try multiple actions, and may focus their efforts at interactions with others in the 
scene and/or their prior self. Before moving on, the researcher/therapist makes sure the participant’s 
intervention is complete.  [From Arntz & Weertman, 1999: Main questions of phases 2 and 3: What 
happens? What do you see? What are you feeling? What are your thoughts about this? What are you 
inclined to do? Okay, do it… (Repeat sequence until it is OK.)] 
In the final phase of the intervention, the participant again assumes the role of the prior self: 
“Good work [or other encouragement]. Now what I want you to do is again assume the perspective of 
your earlier self in the scene, but this time experience the scene as you just did, with your current self 
[intervening – but use language to describe what the current self did; e.g., “standing up for you”]. 
Describe to me what happens, and what you think and what you feel.” Once they have described this, 
ask, “Is there anything more your earlier self would like from you, or would like for you to do to make 
things feel [better]? If so, let that play out now – have your current self give you anything else you 
needed in that moment.”  
Once they have completed these stages fully: 
“You have done some excellent work here. Now let’s do one more thing, to tie together these new 
thoughts and conclusions. You reported having a recurrent image. How might your image change, in 
light of this new perspective?” 
 
Once the exercises are complete, use the template provided (Appendix O) to write new/replacement 
interpretations, and image. 
 
“Now your ‘homework’ over the next week is to think about what you’ve done in here today, and what 
you’ve learned, and see how it might apply to various situations you encounter. In other words, try to 
integrate the work you did in here today into your life in the real world over the coming week.” 
 
Once the exercises are complete, use the template provided (Revised IMC Summary; Appendix O) to 
write new/replacement beliefs, interpretations (to ATs). Enter this information into the electronic version 
of the document immediately following the session. 
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Appendix N: Revised Image/Memory/Cognition (IMC) Summary Sheet. 
 
Post IMB Summary 
 
A) Event: 
 
 
 
B) Image: 
 
 
 
1.a)  Automatic Thought(s): 
 
 
 
 
Core/Encapsulated Belief(s): 
2.a)  Self:  
 
3.a)  Others:  
 
4.a)  World:  
 
 
Updated Perspective: 
Updated Image: 
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1.b)  Updated Interpretation(s): 
 
 
 
Updated Core/Encapsulated Belief(s): 
2.b)  Self:  
 
3.b)  Others:  
 
4.b)  World: 
